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Abstract
Social hierarchy is a pervasive element of modern societies, yet almost absent before
the advent of agriculture during the Neolithic transition. Despite evidence supporting
hierarchy as a product of evolution, it is hard to explain the mechanisms which drove
this evolution. For instance, the evolution of followers appears as a paradox because
followers receive fewer resources than leaders. The “iron law of oligarchy” proposes that
the key to the Neolithic transition lies in the role of leaders in collective decision-making.
First, leaders would emerge in response to an increase in group size because leaders
speed up decision-making and facilitate coordination. Then, leaders would use their
newly acquired influence to bias opinions and group decisions to impose inequality
that benefits themselves. This theory has the benefit of explaining the origin of both
beneficial and despotic sides of leaders. Yet, its investigation has been limited because
of the lack of a formal description of (i) how individuals change with time and (ii) how
individuals take collective decisions. Thus, we propose the evolutionary iron law of
oligarchy, which reinterprets the iron law in evolutionary terms. We reduce leaders
and followers to their capacity to influence and we claim that describing the evolution
of this trait under the environmental changes observed at the Neolithic transition is
sufficient to explain the emergence of helpful and despotic leaders. To investigate this
claim, we build individual-centred models simulating consensus formation — how
individuals take collective decisions — and evolutionary dynamics — how individuals
change with time. On one hand, our results show that the evolutionary iron law of
oligarchy is a viable scenario, which can unify previous theories explaining either the
beneficial or despotic side of leaders. On the other hand, we developed a mechanistic
model of the iron law of oligarchy which can apply across a range of scenarios, and
which show under which conditions the iron law of oligarchy would apply. Finally, our
results demonstrate that the iron law of oligarchy goes beyond political sciences and is
underwritten by the laws of Darwinian evolution. Understanding the factors driving
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[ First Chapter \
Introduction
1.1 Social hierarchy is surprisingly widespread in human
societies
In 1976, the technology company Kodak created the first digital camera, a technology
which would later revolutionise the camera industry. Yet, its leaders took the decision
to stick with film and paper line (Lucas, 2012). At the time of the discovery, Kodak com-
manded over 90 % of the film market. In 2012, Kodak filed for bankruptcy. Over these
three decades, the company lost roughly 80% of its workforce, over 100000 employees.
This single decision had a dreadful impact on the life of numerous persons, but leaders’
decisions can lead to much more sinister outcomes. In 1958, Mao Zedong leader of
the People’s Republic of China and the leaders of the governing political party, took the
decision to reform the economic and social organisation of China (Dikotter, 2011). This
campaign, called "The Great Leap Forward", included massive collectivisation and rapid
industrialisation of the economy. A few years later, these policies led to an economic
and social disaster; for instance the food supply dropped to 70% of the original level
(Yang, 2008). Worsened by deceitful reports, this decision resulted in the Great Chinese
Famine, one of the most deadly events of human history infamous for its millions of
deaths.
Those are a few examples of decisions among countless ones. Who to conquer?
Who to trade with? How to manage the environment? The decisions that take groups
can shape their fate, and even their survival. It is then surprising that only a minority of
individuals are actually involved in the decision-making process. The large majority of
employees in Kodak and citizens of the Republic of China had no say on the decisions
of their leaders. Whether it is in a company, kingdom or democracy, most societies
have given the reins (or burden) of power to a small number of individuals. Of course,
this distribution of power is often challenged as seen in recent political crises, e.g.
Brexit (Clarke et al., 2017), Yellow vests movement (“Gilets jaunes: The French uprising”
2019; Vandepitte, 2019). Yet, the need for having leaders is not often questioned. Hier-
archy emerges over and over despite the countless societies which have been built. In
1
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short, humans value equality but live in hierarchy. How can this paradox be explained?
Ultimately, what drives the emergence and the prevalence of social hierarchy?
First, what do we exactly mean by social hierarchy and social organisation ?1 Social
organisation describes the form of distribution of power and resources within a group.
Resources describes any material providing a benefit to an individual for its survival or
reproduction such as money, land or mating partners. Power describes the influence
that an individual has on others’ behaviours and on group decisions. Social hierarchy
is a particular set of instances of social organisation in which resources and power are
distributed asymmetrically, i.e. concentrated in a minority of individuals. The term
"social" in social hierarchy is used to differentiate it from the broader definition of
hierarchy, which describes the abstract arrangement of items according to relative
importance. We refer to social hierarchy as hierarchy for the rest of the thesis. The
simplest form of hierarchy is described by the presence of a minority of leaders and a
majority of followers. Leaders take most of the decisions and possess a large share of
the resources, while followers have a limited influence on group decisions and receive a
lower share of resources. Examples of leaders and followers are kings and their subjects,
elected presidents and their citizens, chief executive officers (CEO) of a company and
their employees. Hierarchy can describe a large range of social organisation, going from
a slightly asymmetric distribution of power and resources to the most extreme form in
which one individual possesses all the resources and political power, e.g. dictatorship.
We use the term level of hierarchy to describe how much a group is hierarchical, that is
how much power and resources are distributed asymmetrically.
The social organisation of a group is a dynamic process, which changes alongside
time. Investigating the rules governing the change of social organisation can provide
key knowledge to understand its benefits and costs, explain its diversity across space
and time, and manage social organisation. To give an analogy, understanding the rules
governing the evolution of species or the movement of planets helped us understand the
biosphere and the universe. And in the same manner as the universe, human hierarchy
had its big bang.
1.2 From egalitarian hunter-gatherers to hierarchical ag-
riculturists
It is tempting to date the origin of human social hierarchy in times preceding the
emergence of human species. Great apes are species closely related to modern humans
(Homo sapiens) and they are organised in dominance hierarchies where individuals
physically compete for rank, resources and partners (Sussman, 1999). Because different
1For now, we use a broad definition of hierarchy to encompass the literature on the subject. An exact
definition of social organisation and social hierarchy for this thesis is given at section 1.7.
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species of great apes share this particularity, it has been supposed that the last common
ancestor of humans and apes was also organised in such hierarchy, i.e. great apes
would have inherited their social organisation from this past ancestor (Chapais, 2018;
Duda and Zrzavý, 2013). However, the history of human social organisation followed a
surprisingly different path than that of its close cousins.
Unlike great apes, the dominance hierarchy of humans’ ancestor was followed by
a long period of egalitarianism (Boehm, 2001). This egalitarianism was relative in the
sense that some individuals still acted as leaders in particular situations, e.g. the best
hunter leads during hunts (Von Rueden et al., 2014; Garfield et al., 2019b). However,
wealth was distributed relatively equally and no individual could decide by himself of
the fate of other members of the group (Woodburn, 1982; Kelly, 2010; Lee and Daly,
1999; Boehm, 2001). Group decisions, e.g. start a conflict with another tribe; were taken
in an egalitarian way, with every individual having the right to express their opinion. In
the Australian Aborigines of Victoria, the hunter does not decide of the distribution of
the game but it also often gets the worst part (Dawson, 1881). The Mbuti tribe living in
the Congo bassin decides of the next group movement by a shared consensus, reached
after acephaleous discussions (Turnbull, 1962). Hunter-gatherers were not all naturally
inclined toward equality unlike the romantic view of hunter-gatherers developed along
with the first anthropological studies (Gat, 2015) 2. In truth, some individuals still tried
to monopolise resources and powers, but their aspirations were restricted by strong
egalitarian norms enforced by other members of the group (Boehm, 2001). For instance,
in the tribes of hunter-gatherers observed in the last century, the distribution of food is
often ruled by strict norms, which details how the food needs to be distributed (Testart,
1987). In the !Kung Bushmen, the owner of the hunted game is the owner of the first
arrow to penetrate enough the skin of the animal for the poison to make effect (Marshall,
1960). Because arrows are often exchanged, the owner of the game can be someone
else than the the hunter who killed it. Deviations from the egalitarian norms, e.g. not
sharing food, imposing a decision; were punished by the rest of the group first by gossip,
then ostracising and potentially killing. These punishments are well illustrated by the
misadventures of some anthropologists. While they were studying two different tribes
of hunter-gatherers, Jean Briggs and Denett Everett intervened when westerners were
trying to buy goods and services from the tribes in exchange of cheap alcohol. In return,
the Utku, a small group of Inuit First Nations people, casts out Jean Briggs from the
village and ostracised her for months (Briggs, 1971). In the second case, the Piranã tribe
threatens to kill Daniel Everett and its family. Accordingly, the hunter-gatherers’ equality
is sometimes described as a reverse hierarchy rather than egalitarian — a hierarchy
where followers imposed dominance on the uprising leaders.
The transition from the dominance hierarchy of human ancestors to egalitarianism




of hunter-gatherers is the first major turning point in the history of human social organ-
isation. Ultimately, this transition can be explained by the importance of cooperative
behaviours in the new environment of humans (Gintis et al., 2015). For instance, food
sharing assures a reliable source of food despite irregular hunting results. In a more
proximal point of view, the development of cognitive capacities and anti-authoritarian
mechanisms tilted the balance of power toward followers. For example, the capacity to
form large coalitions combined with the development of throwable weapons make any
dissatisfied follower a dangerous threat no matter the physical strength of the dominant
individual (Bingham, 1999; Gintis et al., 2015). Thus, a strong individual could not
impose anymore its dominance on the rest of the group.
Archaeological evidence, e.g. absence of difference of wealth in tombs, similar set-
tlement size; suggests that the egalitarian organisation of human groups remained
largely unmodified for hundreds of thousands of years (Boehm, 2001) 3. It is only 12500
years ago that the first hierarchical societies emerged (Price, 1995). At this period called
Neolithic transition, the advent of agriculture and the domestication of animals revolu-
tionised the lifestyle of humans. Within a few thousand years, human societies switched
from small and nomad groups of hunter-gatherers to large sedentary communities of
farmers. The Neolithic transition also marks a revolution in the organisation of human
societies with the emergence of chiefdoms all around the globe. Chiefdoms are political
entities with a centralised decision-making, which coordinates activities among several
village communities (Service, 1962; Service, 1975; Earle, 1987) 4. The central authority
of a chiefdom usually organises a regional population of thousands to ten thousands of
individuals. In contrast to pre-Neolithic tribes, the leaders are permanent and can take
decisions across a wide range of topics, e.g. agriculture, warfare, religion. These chiefs
exhibit a higher amount of wealth. For instance, settlements and burials of leaders are
larger, more central and contain more goods which can include special foreign objects
achievable only by long-distance trade (see Earle 1987 or Junker 2018 for a detailed
review of inequality in chiefdoms).
Later on, human social organisation continued its course toward more complex
hierarchy, with in particular the emergence of bureaucratic states. States are charac-
terised by a specialised administration dedicated to the organisation of the society
3There has been an ongoing debate on the archaeological evidence showing egalitarian organisation.
The main criticism is that the evidence for egalitarianism is sometimes presented as an absence of
evidence of hierarchy. Two main points counter this criticism. First, hierarchy and egalitarianism are
mutually exclusive states of social organisation and the absence of evidence for one is thus evidence for
the other. Second, it is important to not confuse absence of proof and proof of absence. For instance,
evidence of egalitarianism is not shown by the absence of tombs with difference in wealth but the
presence of tombs with equal wealth. If more archaeological evidence will help settle this debate in
the future, the fact that humans were relatively egalitarian in the pre-Neolithic period (or much more
egalitarian than the Neolithic societies) is so far the consensus among archaeologists.
4Please note that the term chiefdom and the classification of human societies in general is debated
(Spencer, 1990) (see Currie and Mace 2011 for an evolutionary perspective). Without going in the details,
the consensus is that societies with central authority emerge at the Neolithic transition.
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and different layers or levels of hierarchy (Spencer, 1990). However, we focus in this
thesis on the emergence of hierarchy and thus we constrain ourselves to the transition
from egalitarian tribes to the first form of hierarchy, chiefdoms (although states will be
discussed briefly for further work). A large diversity of complex social organisation can
be observed in history but overall, hierarchy is the prevalent organisation. In the last
millennia, egalitarian organisation still exists in small groups but is rarely observed in
large groups on a long period.
For hundreds of thousands of years, hierarchy was almost absent in human societies.
12, 500 years ago, hierarchy started to spread all over the world. Today it is pervasive at
any scale. What was the driver of such an impressive transition? It is hard to provide a
simple answer mainly because the emergence of hierarchy appears as a paradox. Indeed,
leaders enjoy preferential access to resources (Earle, 1987), a better health (Hatch, 1987;
Marmot, 2005), and a higher number of mating partners (Zeitzen, 2008; Betzig, 1982).
In short, the position of leader is more beneficial than the position of follower and
such even when taking in account the cost of potential additional work done by leaders
(Hayden and Villeneuve, 2010). Thus, why would any individual rationally accept a
position of being a follower who might be exploited? The true puzzle of the emergence
of hierarchy lies in solving this apparent paradox.
A first key to this problem lies in the other major change that happens at the Neolithic
transition: the advent of agriculture. The general consensus is that the environmental
changes brought by agriculture, kicked off the transition from equality to hierarchy
(Price, 1995). However, this does not totally solve the puzzle because agriculture has led
to numerous changes in the environment of humans, which can potentially explain the
emergence of hierarchy. For instance, agriculture created defensible surplus resources
(Smith et al., 2010; Bowles et al., 2010), increased group size (Bocquet-Appel, 2011; Aimé
and Austerlitz, 2017) and reduced the mobility of individuals (Carneiro, 1970; Allen,
1997). To get further insight, we need to look at the roles and behaviours of leaders.
1.3 Coercive explanations for the emergence of hierarchy
A first possible explanation to the emergence of hierarchy is that followers do not have
a choice. Dominance hierarchy can not be imposed by physical strength anymore, as
seen in human ancestors, but it could be imposed by other means such as coercive
institutions, e.g. taxes, army. Individuals could become dominant by building up
economic and military power, which can then be used to get more economic and
military power.
Coercive explanations see social organisation as the result of a tug-of-war between
leaders and followers (Summers, 2005; Johnstone, 2000). The cognitive and technolo-
gical innovations in hunter-gatherers would have tilted the balance of power toward
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followers, allowing them to create a reverse hierarchy. But agriculture would have re-
stored the powers of leaders, even amplified these powers. On the one hand, agriculture
created large surplus resources which can be stored and defended (Smith et al., 2010;
Bowles et al., 2010). Freed from food sharing required to sustain a hunter-gatherer
lifestyle, leaders would have taken advantage of surplus resources to build up domin-
ance and control others with . On the other hand, agriculture led to sedentary lifestyle
because farming is a process that benefits only in the long term. Thus, the cost of
escaping a despotic leader for a more egalitarian organisation would have been much
more important. With leaders controlling the most productive lands, followers would
have been better off accepting the dominance of leaders (Carneiro, 1970).
Coercive explanations for the emergence of hierarchy propose that hierarchy is
imposed by leaders using coercive means. But how to explain the emergence of hier-
archy in the first place when any advanced form of coercion was absent? Despite
leaders being freed from food sharing, it is unlikely that leaders could have established
dominance using coercion in groups of partisans of equality. Much anthropological
evidence shows that inequality was strongly limited in pre-hierarchical societies be-
cause of anti-authoritarian mechanisms, e.g. gossip, ostracisation; and the absence of
coercive institutions, e.g. dedicated armies and tax collection (Boehm, 2001). One could
argue that some lucky individuals would have accumulated enough resources without
attracting undue attention of coalitions of equals. But it is unlikely knowing that for
hundreds of thousands of years, coalitions of followers have imposed strong dominance
on uprising leaders and successfully maintained equality (Boehm, 2001). Coercive the-
ories can explain the maintenance of hierarchical societies but they struggle to explain
the evolution of social hierarchy in the first place.
An alternative theory called the "iron law of oligarchy" proposes that in the ab-
sence of means to build up economic or military power, leaders have established their
dominance by accumulating political power, i.e. influence over collective decisions
(Michels, 1911). Leaders might exert their influence to leverage institutional rules and
bias collective decisions in their favour, e.g. distribution of resources, command of
military (Dahrendorf, 1959). This political power over collective decision could have
been used to build up economic and military power, which then can provide coercive
means to impose dominance.
This explanation still suggests that leaders have been able to monopolise the political
power in the first place despite the careful watch of egalitarian members of the group.
Functional theories propose that political power has not been stolen by leaders but it has
been voluntary relinquished to them because centralising authority facilitates the group
organisation. Whether it is to build an irrigation system, to plan a future battle or to vote
a new law, each collective task requires participants to agree on countless decisions. As
can be seen in ancient cooperative hunting (Skyrms, 2003) or in a modern share-holder
meeting, leaders are strongly involved in organisation for instance assigning the role
6
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
of each, settling arguments between decision-makers and helping to decide the future
course of action (Calvert, 1992). The organisational benefit of hierarchy would have
allowed the group to tackle more complex and more beneficial collective tasks, e.g.
build a more elaborated irrigation system, win more battles, maintain cooperation at a
larger scale by creating institutional rules (Ostrom, 1990).
1.4 Functional explanations for the emergence of hierarchy
Functional explanations see the emergence of leaders as voluntary and social hierarchy
as an adaptation. Hierarchy would have resulted from the demographic explosion
initiated by agriculture (Bocquet-Appel, 2011). Hunter-gatherer tribes are composed
of hundreds of individuals whereas chiefdoms contain thousands of individuals. As a
group grows, stresses build up on the decision-making because the number of decisions
and the difficulty to take them also increase (Johnson, 1982). Leaders could have arisen
in response to this scalar stress because leaders would facilitate group organisation
(Calvert, 1992). Reviews of ethnographic data presents evidence that group size scales
with political complexity, i.e. the number of political units, (Johnson, 1982; Carneiro,
1967), number of organisational traits (Carneiro, 1967) or probability of group fission
(Alberti, 2014). On one side of the range, small-whale hunters have one single coach
to coordinate group hunting (Friesen, 1999). On the other extreme, modern states or
companies have dozens of politicians and managers who are fully dedicated to the task
of organising.
The functional explanations for the emergence of hierarchy have the benefit of
filling the gap of coercive theories because it provides an explanation for the emergence
of hierarchy in groups initially egalitarian. However, the functional explanations are
not straightforward. As mentioned before, leaders receive more resources and have
more offspring than followers. Thus, it is still advantageous for an individual to be a
leader rather than a follower, even if it is at the expense of the whole group capacity
to organise. Why would an individual become a costly follower instead of letting his
neighbour fulfilling this role? A functional emergence of hierarchy suggests that the
group benefit brought by hierarchy would be enough to overcome individual pressure
driving everyone to become a leader rather than a follower (Spisak et al., 2015). Yet,
there is a conflict between individual and group interests which makes this condition
not trivial (Frank, 1998; West et al., 2007).
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1.5 An evolutionary investigation of the iron law of olig-
archy
Coercive theories see social organisation as the result of the balance of power between
leaders and followers. These theories explain the maintenance of hierarchy by leaders
using economic power and coercive means to impose dominance and sustain the
hierarchy. Yet, they overlook the beneficial role of leaders and struggle to explain the
emergence of hierarchy in the first place. Functional theories see social organisation
as an adaptation. These theories explain the emergence of hierarchy by the roles
that leaders play in the group, which would have been amplified by the demographic
increase brought by agriculture. Yet, they overlook the despotic role of leaders and apply
in restricted conditions. The iron law of oligarchy unifies these two explanations. It
states that political leaders arise to deal with the complexity of coordination as a group
expands, therefore allowing these leaders to bias collective decisions in their favour
(Michels, 1911) 5.
The iron law of oligarchy has the benefit of providing a comprehensive scenario
for the emergence of hierarchy encompassing both the functional and despotic role
of leaders. However, the generality of the iron law of oligarchy has been challenged
by new evidence on human organisations (Leach, 2015). Criticisms stress that some
assumptions of the iron law of oligarchy lack of justifications. For instance, it is not
clear why centralising power would facilitate group organisation (Breines, 1980; Roth-
schild and Whitt, 1986) or why leaders would always become despotic (Edelstein, 1967;
Schumpeter, 1942). Consequently, it is still not clear under which conditions the iron
law of oligarchy holds. Further investigation of the iron law of oligarchy has been limited
because this theory proposes a verbal model, which lacks of a more formal description.
In particular, the iron law of oligarchy is a theory which describes changes in social
organisation but is not grounded in a supported theory which describes how societies
change.
To fill this gap, we need to examine in finer details where does social organisation
come from. Social organisation is the reflect – an emerging property – of the behaviours
of society members. It is because some individuals act as leaders and some individuals
act as followers that there is a hierarchy. More precisely, human adaptation to hierarchy
appeared under two forms (Pielstick, 2000), expressed in (i) human personalities (Judge
et al., 2002), and (ii) human preferences. First, hierarchy can emerge from the fact
that a minority of individuals have a leader personality and a majority have a follower
personality. Leaders and followers are then defined by their intrinsic characteristics
5Please note that this theory or part of this theory might have been proposed by other authors (in
particular in other fields). We still designate this explanation by the term iron law of oligarchy because it
is the first and most known occurrence of such explanation, as far as goes our knowledge.
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either physical, e.g. height (Berggren et al., 2010), or psychological, e.g. talkativeness,
charisma (Judge et al., 2002). For instance, leader effectiveness is highly correlated with
particular psychological traits such as openness and extroversion (Judge et al., 2002).
This hierarchy where leaders and followers are defined by their intrinsic characteristics
is called informal hierarchy. Second, hierarchy can emerge from cultural preferences
toward institutional rules supporting hierarchy. In such case, leaders and followers
are appointed by decision of the group or a subset of the group. For example, groups
confronted by other groups in collective games explicitly elect and identify an individual
as a leader (Sherif et al., 1954). We call this form of hierarchy institutional hierarchy to
stress that it is supported by institutional rules, which are created by group decision
and actively enforced by monitoring and punishment (Ostrom, 1990; Hurwicz, 1996).
Thus, explaining the evolution of hierarchy is to explain (i) the evolution of leaders
and followers behaviours, i.e. informal hierarchy and/or (ii) the evolution of preference
toward hierarchy, i.e. institutional hierarchy.
Taking in account this detail is important because, if the rules governing how soci-
eties change are hardly known, the rules governing change in human behaviours are
well described. The theory of evolution by natural selection (Darwin, 1859) and its
modern synthesis are a set of theories which describes precisely the rules and processes
governing the change in human behaviours, whether it comes from biological char-
acteristics or cultural preferences 6. Although other processes can lead to change in
human behaviours, Darwin’s theory of evolution is a critical paradigm to understand the
changes in human behaviour because Darwinian evolution is the main driver of change
on a long time scale (Rosenberg, 2017). In the recent years, there has been an extensive
effort to incorporate social and political sciences theory within the evolutionary theory
paradigm (Rosenberg, 2015; Mesoudi, 2011). Doing so has important benefits. First,
it provides support to the studied social sciences theories by showing it can fit into
the theory of evolution by natural selection, one of the most supported theories in
biological sciences. Second, evolutionary processes can be rigorously described by
mathematical rules and thus, can provide a formal exploration of social theories (Otto
and Day, 2007). Last but not least, it provides key knowledge on evolutionary processes
and in particular, how evolution behaves in social settings.
Before going further, it is important to review the evidence that the characteristics
underlying hierarchy not only evolve but can also be selected. Selection is crucial be-
cause it is the evolutionary force which drives characteristics toward a certain direction.
In absence of the conditions necessary for selection, Darwinian evolution can not be
accounted for explaining the common trend observed in the evolution of social organ-
isation. To be selected, the individual characteristics underlying hierarchy require to
follow three rules (Lewontin, 1970):




• The traits need to vary. It is easily explained by the mutation process.
• The traits need to be heritable. Evidence indicates that the physical and psy-
chological characteristics underlying leader and follower behaviours are partially
heritable (Judge et al., 2002). The social position of leader is also partially heritable
(Dal Bó et al., 2009).
• The traits need to modify the fitness, i.e. reproductive value. Evidence shows that
leader positions are associated with higher income, resources and access to mate
partners (Betzig, 1982; Earle, 1987; Hatch, 1987; Marmot, 2005).
Evidence supports that the social organisation of human group is partly the product
of selection 7 (Van Vugt et al., 2007; Van Vugt et al., 2008; Van Vugt et al., 2011). It is
important to note that it does not mean that social organisation has to be the result of
genetic selection, but it can also be the product of cultural selection. The support either
biologic or cultural of hierarchy is not our prior concern here, provided that the traits
underlying hierarchy follow the rules of selection.
In conclusion, we propose in this thesis an evolutionary version of the iron law
of oligarchy. The evolutionary iron law of oligarchy investigates the same scenario
proposed by the iron law of oligarchy but it reinterprets this scenario in evolutionary
terms. It takes in account the benefit and cost in term of reproductive success of the
different traits of individuals. Doing so, it can provide the direction of selection forces
driving the change in these traits and how different environmental factors affect it.
1.6 A main limit to evolutionary models of hierarchy: how
to describe hierarchy at the individual level?
The evolution of hierarchy has been commonly studied using models. Models are
simplified versions of reality, which focus only on important features of a system. They
are widely used in evolution to study the different paths of evolving traits thanks to the
simplicity of the mathematical rules underlying Darwinian evolutionary process (Otto
and Day, 2007). They are particularly useful to study the evolution of human behaviours
because they allow to reproduce past scenarios and bridge together the small pieces
of evidence from past human history. Evolutionary models have been successfully
developed to explore coercive theories (Johnstone and Cant, 1999) or functional theories,
i.e. leaders as a monitors (Hooper et al., 2010), leaders as contributors (Gavrilets and
Fortunato, 2014), leaders as managers (Powers and Lehmann, 2014). However, there
is limited work on the scenario proposed by the ""iron law of oligarchy", either on the
7for extensive review see (Van Vugt et al., 2011).
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evolution of leaders as coordinators, leaders using influence to create despotism or a
combination of these two parts.
This gap can be explained by that to study the evolution of hierarchy requires to
describe processes on different levels of abstraction, i.e. individual and group. For
instance, hierarchy is a property of a group but behaviour is a property of an individual.
Yet, both levels or how they relate need to be described. It is a well-known problem of
multilevel evolutionary processes (Okasha, 2008): (i) how to describe a group-level trait
in terms of the traits of its individual members, and (ii) how to link individual traits back
to group fitness? Hierarchy is often described as a proportion of leaders and followers.
But leaders and followers describe a large number of behavioural traits and it is difficult
to pin down a particular one, which could explain the benefit they bring to organisation.
The lack of description of hierarchy at the level of individual has lead to several gaps in
the iron law of oligarchy. 8.
First, the immediate consequence of missing a description of leaders and followers
is that the evolution of leaders and followers personalities, i.e. informal hierarchy can
not be studied. Nonetheless, informal hierarchy does not require political institutions
and thus is a strong candidate to explain the first emergence of hierarchy. Similarly,
it is difficult to investigate the evolution of different forms of institutional hierarchy,
which are often summarised as a discrete state of the group, e.g. absolute equality or
absolute hierarchy. Second, the conflict between group benefit and individual cost
and its role on the evolution of hierarchy can not be captured. Nonetheless, the main
limit of functional theory lies in this assumption that the benefit that a leader brings
to a follower is high enough to counterbalance the cost of being an exploited follower.
Third, the absence of a description of hierarchy at the level of individuals means that
the effect of hierarchy on group organisation has to be assumed. Nonetheless, the
core postulate of the iron law of oligarchy is that leaders facilitate but bias collective
decision-making. These effects are hard to measure but can be deduced from the
micro-interactions between individuals during collective decision-making. Fourth, the
competition between informal and institutional hierarchy has not been investigated.
On one hand, informal hierarchy exists "by default". It emerges from the personalities of
individuals without any need to enforce it. On the other hand, institutional hierarchies
need to be actively created and enforced. For instance, individuals not respecting the
decided hierarchy needs to be monitored and punished. Yet, institutional hierarchies
are surprisingly pervasive in modern societies, given that they carry additional costs in
comparison to informal ones.
To summarise, the lack of a description of hierarchy at the level of individuals results
in a number of gaps in the investigation of an evolutionary version of the iron law of
oligarchy:
8The lack of formal description of hierarchy and in particular “oligarchy” also has resulted in debates
and confusions in political sciences, as researchers were using different definitions (Leach, 2005)
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• There is no general model describing the effect of leader and follower on group
decision-making.
• There is no investigation of the role of organisation to explain the evolution of
informal hierarchy.
• There is no investigation of the competition between informal and institutional
hierarchy.
• There is no investigation of the evolution of despotism and economic inequality
from initially hierarchical but egalitarian groups.
1.7 Social organisation as a distribution of influence
In this thesis, we propose a new formalisation of leaders and followers, social organisa-
tion and social hierarchy. Taking inspiration from the iron law of oligarchy and previous
works (Gavrilets et al., 2016; Johnstone and Manica, 2011), we define social organisation
by the distribution of political power, i.e. the realised influence of an individual on
group decision. We define realised influence as the weight of an individual’s opinion on
the group’s decision.
Nonetheless, realised influence is not a biological or cultural characteristic, and thus
can not evolve. Hence, we define individual by an intrinsic influence which summar-
ises traits by which an individual is able to influence collective decisions 9. This trait
depends of the capacity of an individual to communicate its opinion and it summar-
ises three traits: persuasion, talkativeness and stubbornness. We choose these three
characteristics because we suppose that they are required for an individual to influence
group decisions. Individuals with high intrinsic influence will keep their initial opinion
(stubbornness), transmit it in a efficient way (persuasiveness) to a high number of
individuals (talkativeness). On the contrary, an individual who is persuasive but not
talkative will not spread their opinions above a few other individuals. Another example
is a persuasive but not stubborn individual, who will not transmit their preferences but
the last opinion they heard. In addition, these traits are observed in psychological pro-
files of leaders (Judge et al., 2002). We refer to intrinsic influence as influence because it
is the main focus of the work presented here.
We define the social organisation of a group as the distribution of individuals’ influ-
ence. Egalitarian to highly hierarchical groups are represented by an equal to strongly
positively skewed distribution of influence.
This formalisation has several benefits:
9It is the same distinction that Johnstone and Manica (2011) do between intrinsic leadership (equi-
valent to intrinsic influence here) and effective leadership (equivalent to realised influence here).
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• It captures a wide range of forms of hierarchy, from egalitarian to extremely
hierarchical.
• It captures the continuous range of more or less leader like and follower like
behaviours, e.g. from extreme leader to extreme follower.
• It is abstract enough to describe both informal and institutional hierarchy. The
influence of an individual can result from its personality or group decision. For
instance, an individual can have a high influence because he is more talkative or
because his position gives him more opportunity to speak.
• If we restrain the range of organisation we are looking at, we can describe the
social organisation of a group by one value, the skewness of the distribution of
influence.
In this thesis, we claim that the influence is the major feature of leaders and followers,
and that is sufficient to explain the evolution of both functional hierarchy and despotism
under the conditions observed at the Neolithic transition.
1.8 Summary and research questions
Our thesis is that describing leaders and followers by their influence is enough to explain
(i) how leaders facilitate but bias group organisation, (ii) the evolution of functional
hierarchy with leaders as organisers and (iii) the evolution of despotism with leaders
imposing inequality. The scenario for the emergence of hierarchy that we investigate
is the following. The advent of agriculture led to an increase in group size and thus
increased the benefit of hierarchy. The increase in group size drove the evolution of
influential leaders and influenceable followers because they facilitate group organisa-
tion, and even more so in large groups. Once influential leaders and influenceable
followers are in place, leaders had been able to bias collective decisions to monopolise
resources and bias followers’ opinions to avoid being punished by followers. Using this
advantage, leaders evolved despotic behaviours and created economic equality. High
levels of hierarchy would have been maintained by subsequent increases in group size
and by leaders using their political and economic power to strengthen their position.
To investigate this scenario, we combine models of social dynamics, i.e. how indi-
viduals interact, and models of evolutionary dynamics, i.e. how individuals change with
time. Because of the nonlinearities of the model, which result from the interactions of
all of the variables, we analyse it using replicated individual-centred simulations.
The first gap to fill is to investigate if and how leaders could facilitate group organ-
isation. We propose that leaders could reduce costs of organisation by reducing the
time a group spend to reach consensus. The time spent to reach consensus is costly
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because groups that take too long to reach a decision may lose resources or eventually
fail the collective task, e.g. no decision taken before a battle starts. Thus, we investigate
the following question:
Research question 1. Does a skewed distribution of influence within a group reduce the
time to reach consensus?
In Chapter 3, we mathematically describe collective decision-making by an opinion
formation model, which consists of a sequence of discussions between individuals until
a global consensus is reached (Castellano et al., 2009). We extend this model to integrate
leaders and followers, defined by different values of influence.
We demonstrate that a skewed distribution of influence is enough to reduce the
time to reach consensus and scalar stress, i.e. the increase of time to reach consensus
as group size increases. In addition, hierarchy with an influential single leader leads
to bigger reductions in (i) the consensus time, (ii) the variation in the consensus
time, and (iii) the increase in consensus time as group size increases.
Even if social hierarchy facilitates group organisation, it is not clear if this benefit
can overcome the selection pressures driving everyone to become a leader instead of an
exploited followers. This leads us to the next question:
Research question 2. Can the organisational advantage of a skewed distribution of
influence drive the evolution of individuals toward leader and followers behaviours even
if it creates inequality?
In Chapter 4, we develop an evolutionary model where influence is an evolving trait.
The population is structured in patches and within a patch, individuals organise to-
gether to produce a collective good. We integrate the previous opinion formation model
to describe the collective decision-making of groups. The time to reach consensus
determines the cost of organisation, and the realised influence of an individual on the
final decision determines that individual’s share of the collective good, i.e. influential
individuals receive more resources.
We demonstrate that leaders and followers behaviours, i.e. informal hierarchy
can evolve de novo in the presence of low initial inequality and increasing returns to
scale 10, which are two reasonable assumptions for small-scale societies as observed
before the Neolithic transition
The emergence of institutional hierarchy, i.e. chosen leader, can also be explained
by the fact that it reduces costs of organisation (Powers and Lehmann, 2014). However,
10Increasing returns to scale describes the fact that an increase in the scale of an operation (here




institutional hierarchies are surprisingly pervasive in modern societies, given that they
carry additional costs in comparison to informal ones. We propose that a key to this
puzzle lies in the particularity of institutions which allow humans to hand-tune their
behaviours and create single-leader hierarchy, in comparison to informal hierarchies
in which leaders emerge through evolutionary processes. Thus we ask the following
question:
Research question 3. Can the organisational advantage of single leader hierarchy drive
the evolution of preferences toward institutionalised hierarchy despite the additional cost
of institutions?
In Chapter 5, we extend the previous evolutionary model such that individuals
can choose between informal social organisation where the influence of individuals is
defined by individuals’ characteristics, or institutional social organisation where the
influence of individuals is defined by the institution. Individuals evolve both personality
and preferences toward institutions.
We demonstrate that individuals evolve cultural preferences towards institutional
hierarchy because (i) it provides a greater organisational advantage than informal
hierarchy, (ii) reduces the detrimental effect of group size on the time to organise
collective action and (iii) is more resilient in the face of inequality.
In both previous models, the development of social hierarchy creates inequality be-
cause influential leaders bias the decision and hence receive a higher share of resources.
But even if leaders have a higher influence on collective decisions in hierarchical societ-
ies (Gavrilets et al., 2016), their despotic behaviours should be constrained indirectly by
the satisfaction of the rest of the group. We propose that the large influence of leaders
provide them with a mean to bypass the watch of followers and create larger level of
inequality. Thus, we investigate the following question:
Research question 4. Does a centralised social network structure lead to the evolution
of despotism in hierarchical societies ?
In Chapter 6, we build an evolutionary model where individuals are explicitly organ-
ised in a network structure either random or centralised with a leader as central node.
Individuals are described by their preferences on the distribution of resources, and
their opinions on the actual level of fairness in the society. We simulate the evolution of
their distribution preferences and study how the network structure affects the level of
despotism.
We demonstrate that a transition from equality to despotism will happen in pres-
ence of (i) highly influential individuals with a preferential access of resources; and
(ii) weakly connected followers. This is because influential leaders are able to bias
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followers opinion, thus jeopardising the followers’ capacity to monitor and punish
despotic leaders.
In Chapter 7, we summarise our results. We show that our contributions combined
to previous works provide a strong theoretical support behind an “evolutionary iron
law of oligarchy”. We present further work to extend this theoretical work and to ex-
perimentally test our predictions. Finally, we discuss how this work contributes to our
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[ Second Chapter \
Theories of the evolutionary origins of
hierarchy
The emergence of social hierarchy has been thoroughly studied. Proof shall be in the
multitude of theories proposing their explanations for the origin of hierarchy. In this
chapter, we give an overview of the most supported theories of evolution of hierarchy.
We aim to give the reader a grasp of the past and current state of research on the
evolution of hierarchy and shed light on the gaps that the theory explored in this thesis
fulfils.
This chapter is organised as follow. First, we describe what theories of evolution of
hierarchy are trying to explain and model. To do so, we present the important features
of the event that we aim to explain (the explanandum) – the transition from egalitarian
to hierarchical societies – and the features of the event which is used to explain (the
explanans) – the environmental changes brought by the advent of agriculture. We
then describe how previous theories have connected these two events together. We
divide the theories into two parts, coercive theories and functional theories. Coercive
theories focus on the despotic side of leaders. They suggest that hierarchy emerges
because leaders use coercive means to impose dominance on the rest of the group.
Functional theories focus on the beneficial role fulfilled by leaders. They suggest that
group members voluntarily adopt hierarchy because of the benefit it brings to them.
Coercive and functional theories each explain one facet of hierarchy, but overlooks the
other. We describe how a theory from political sciences – “the iron law of oligarchy” – can
fill these gaps and unify coercive and function theories. We propose to investigate this
theory with an evolutionary perspective and we describe how doing so can answer the
criticisms on this theory. Finally, a major gap in an “evolutionary iron law of oligarchy”
is the lack of a microscopic description of the role of leaders on group organisation, i.e.
how leaders help the group organise. We show how the field of social dynamics can fill
this gap and provide a new view on previous theories of evolution of hierarchy.
18
CHAPTER 2. THEORIES OF THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF HIERARCHY
2.1 Archaeological and anthropological evidence on the
Neolithic transition
The first step to build a theory is to identify and define what the theory is trying to
explain. Theories on the evolutionary origins of hierarchy have aimed at connecting
the two main events of the Neolithic transition (i) the emergence of hierarchy and
(ii) the environmental changes brought by agriculture. In this section, we present the
important features of these two events.
First, let settle down possible confusion on the term ”transition” in Neolithic trans-
ition. The Neolithic transition was not a sudden change which happens in all groups
around the world. In truth, the Neolithic transition was spread on thousands of years
and happened at different periods for different regions of the world. For instance, ag-
riculture emerges at different time for different human population (Diamond, 1997),
e.g. the domestication of rice in China is considered to have happened along 5000
years (Jones and Liu, 2009); and the transition from hunter-gatherer to farming was
progressive, e.g. some groups relied on a mix of hunting, gathering and farming (Smith,
2001). There is also a a number of places where human groups still live as egalitarian
hunter gatherer. However, we talk about Neolithic transition because we observe a clear
shift from egalitarian hunter-gatherers to hierarchical agriculturists in the majority of
human societies, and that in a short time on the scale of archaeological time.
2.1.1 The Neolithic transition and the emergence of social hierarchy
The Neolithic transition marks the emergence of hierarchy and leadership in human
societies. However, depending of the definition used, leadership is considered already
present in animals, in hunter-gatherers, or present only later in modern complex societ-
ies. Indeed, hierarchy and leadership have been studied by a wide range of scientific
fields. From social sciences to evolutionary biology through to multi-agent systems, the
semantics employed vary widely. In this section, we precise the important features of
the hierarchical societies emerging at the Neolithic transition and how they differ to
other notions of leadership found in the scientific literature.
2.1.2 The explanandum: Leaders of post-Neolithic societies
2.1.2.1 Features of leaders of post-Neolithic societies
In brief, the Neolithic transition describes the emergence of leaders which:
• possess a higher amount of resources;
• have some form of control on other individuals;
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• are permanents, i.e. the two previous features are present for most of the life of
the leaders;
The association between inequality of wealth and hierarchy is well known (Flannery
and Marcus, 2012; Hayden, 2001). Written records from ancient societies already present
disparities in resources distribution and reproduction (Betzig, 1993; Boone, 1992).
Comparative and ethnographic studies of recent societies also reveal dramatic examples
of despotism and differential reproduction (Casimir and Rao, 1995; Betzig, 1982). This
inequality can be expressed in different manner. First, the most obvious inequality
of resources is inequality of wealth. Post Neolithic leaders all exhibit disproportional
amount of wealth (Earle, 1989). In the tribes of Northwest coast of North America,
one fifth to one half of all food produced are surrendered to chiefs for the purpose
of redistribution during feasts. In reality, considerably less was redistributed than
was received (Ruyle, 1973). Hayden and Villeneuve (2010) finds similar results on
Futuna and other Polynesian islands. The inequality can also be expressed in access
of mating partners (Zeitzen, 2008; Betzig, 1982). For instance, in Amazonian Indian
tribes, polygamy is an exclusive privilege of leaders and a sign of their power. Finally,
this inequality can also be expressed more indirectly, for instance in rights. In the
Polynesian islands, only the chief and their families have the right to construct the
larger canoes used for inter-island trade (Hayden, 2001). Ultimately, these benefits are
all translated into an evolutionary benefit. Leaders have a better chance of survival and
a higher number of offspring.
Second, leaders in post Neolithic societies have some sort of control on other indi-
viduals. It can be that leaders can influence others’ behaviours, punish them, or take
decisions for the group. Often, leaders use this power to facilitate collective action.
For instance, leaders can use their powers to punish defectors and enforce coopera-
tion among members of the group (Kracke, 1978), solve conflict between individuals
(Glowacki and Rueden, 2015) or coordinate individuals (Calvert, 1992). One of the most
emblematic examples is the whale hunters of Lamalera Indonesia (Alvard and Nolin,
2002). To capture such big game, alone is impossible. Hunters spread on different
boats and cooperate during an extended period of time to finally capture the whale.
Each boat activities are organised by one man, who acts as a coach or manager (Alvard
and Nolin, 2002). It is worth noting that this power can be used for the benefit of the
leader rather than for the benefit of the group. In other words, the inequality of power
and the inequality of resources are often related. For instance, in Zulu, leaders had
the right to accuse any individuals for offence and punish the guilty individuals by
appropriating cattle, then increasing its wealth (Krige, 1950). Interestingly, in Zululand,
offences defined a wide range of action including partaking of first fruits before the king
had tasted them, coughing, spitting, or sneezing while the king was eating.
The Neolithic transition is a transition from an equal distribution of wealth and
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power to an unequal distribution of wealth and power, which is concentrated in few
permanent leaders.
2.1.2.2 What does this thesis not talk about? Other notions of leadership in the literature
The topic of leadership and hierarchy has been widely studied and thus, the terms
had been defined differently across fields. In this section, we present the differences
between the notion of leadership studied here and other definitions of leadership found
in the literature knowingly in animals, in pre-Neolithic societies and in states (for a
short review of the different notions of leadership, we advise the first part of Garfield
et al. 2019b).
First, the term “leaders” is sometimes used to describe some individuals which
have temporary authority in pre-Neolithic societies of hunter-gatherers (Von Rueden
and Van Vugt, 2015). However, these leaders have two main differences with leaders of
post-Neolithic societies. First, leadership in hunter-gatherer tribes is situational and
facultative. In other words, a large number of group decisions were taken without any
leaders. When there was a leader, its power was confined to a particular task or context,
i.e. the best hunter might lead during hunting but does not get to decide how to distrib-
ute the hunted game. For instance, the !Kung of the Kalahari Desert are egalitarian but
they recognised leaders during camp moves (Marshall, 1960). The Tsimane foragers
elect individuals to represent their communities but their position hold in average for
5 years (but sometimes short as few months) (Von Rueden et al., 2014). The second
important difference between the leadership before and after the Neolithic transition
is that leaders in hunter-gatherer tribes did not receive or accumulate a large amount
of resources (Woodburn, 1982; Boehm, 2001). Following on the same example, the
Tsimane foragers have leaders during collective fishing. Yet, these leaders do not receive
a higher share of the fish stock (Von Rueden et al., 2014). These differences lead to fun-
damentally different problems when looking at leadership in tribes of hunter-gatherers
or in chiefdoms. For instance, the origin of followers in hunter-gatherer tribes is not
a paradox because followers do not receive less resources than leaders. Actually, the
question is sometimes reversed with the problem being why some individuals act as
leaders if they do not receive more resources to compensate the costs of their extra
work (Von Rueden and Van Vugt, 2015; Price and Van Vugt, 2014)? In addition, there is
a clear benefit for individuals to follow the most knowledgeable individual as seen in
hunter-gatherers. However, it is harder to explain why individuals would follow a leader
in post-Neolithic hierarchies, where the leader might take decision on a large range of
diverse topics, even if they have a limited knowledge on these topics.
Second, the term “leadership” is sometimes used to describe particular individuals
in animal groups exhibiting collective behaviour. However, most examples of leadership
in non-humans describe an emerging property in a particular context rather than a
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permanent social organisation. For instance, leaders can describe the first movers
during swarming or migration events (Couzin et al., 2005; Garland et al., 2018). Some
animals exhibit leadership which shares interesting features with human leadership
(Conradt and List, 2009; Smith et al., 2016). For instance, primates are organised in
dominance hierarchies where one individual can get more resources and thus a better
chance of survival (Sapolsky, 2005). The African wild dog (Lycaon pictus) uses sneezing
to vote on the departure of the group and recent research suggests that dominant
individual initiates the depart faster than others (Walker et al., 2017). Yet, such forms of
leadership can be explained by differential energetic demands (the most hungry moves
first), asymmetry of information, division of labour and physical dominance. These
explanations are not enough to explain such permanent and pervasive leadership as
observed in human societies after the Neolithic transition. In addition, the parallel
between animals and humans is often limited as humans differ by having cumulative
cultural evolution (Dean et al., 2014), language (Berwick and Chomsky, 2016), advanced
cognitive capacities (Hill et al., 2009), cultural niche construction (Laland and O’Brien,
2011), and large-scale cooperation (Bingham, 1999).
Third, it would be tempting to take current societies as a good example of hierarch-
ical societies. However, we constrain the study presented in this thesis to the emergence
of the first form of hierarchy in human societies. The hierarchy studied here (usu-
ally called chiefdoms in anthropology Service 1962) is characterised by a single layer
of authority. Modern societies have much more complex form of hierarchy (usually
called states in anthropology Spencer 1990) with multiple layers of authority, strong
institutionalisation of the hierarchy and specialised administration. Explaining the
emergence of states is a crucial topic but we believe that it requires to first understand
the emergence of simpler and earlier forms of hierarchy. We also do not discuss the
literature in leadership studies, e.g. contingency leadership (Fiedler, 1964), transforma-
tional leadership (Bass, 1990); which aims to understand the effects of different forms
of leadership on modern organisations rather than the emergence of leadership itself.
In this section, we have defined the important features of the hierarchical societies
observed after the Neolithic transition. We now review the other major event of the
Neolithic transition: the advent of agriculture.
2.1.3 The explanans: The environmental changes brought by the ad-
vent of agriculture
The main candidate to explain the emergence of hierarchy is the advent of agriculture
(Price, 1995) because (i) the transition in social organisation is correlated with the devel-
opment of agriculture and (ii) agriculture led to many environmental changes. Different
theories have looked at different environmental changes brought by agriculture to
explain the transition in social organisation. These environmental changes are:
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• Increase in population size. The Neolithic transitions marks a huge increase in
the demography, for instance reflected in cemetery data (Bocquet-Appel, 2011) or
genomic data (Aimé and Austerlitz, 2017). 1
• Increase of cost of migration. Agriculture requires long term investment and daily
maintenance (Carneiro, 1970; Allen, 1997). Thus, agriculture goes along with a
transition from nomadic lifestyle to sedentary lifestyle.
• Emergence of surplus resources, which can be stored, defended and transmitted
(Smith et al., 2010; Bowles et al., 2010). Unlike hunting game which needs to be
consumed quickly, products of agriculture can be conserved and stored. The
capacity to store resources has also been developed by the emergence of storage
technology. The surplus resources can be used for trade, and later on, allows
the development of advanced form of division of labour and craft specialists,
e.g. potters, blacksmith. It is worth noting that the surplus resources brought by
agriculture might have been limited at the beginning because of the high labour
cost of agriculture (Bowles, 2011).
A complete theory explaining the evolutionary origins of social hierarchy should be
able to provide a chain of causal links which connects the environmental changes of
the Neolithic to the changes in social organisation. The next section will now review the
theories which have pursued this goal and present the results of the main models built
in support.
2.2 Evolutionary theories on the origin of hierarchy
In this section, we present the different theories explaining the evolution of social
hierarchy and leadership. We focus but not restrain ourselves to literature presenting
theoretical models of the evolution of leadership. This is because first, models provide
the backbone of theories by presenting and investigating a chain of causal links. Second,
we look at evolution because there is strong evidence for hierarchy being partly the
result of evolution (Van Vugt et al., 2011) and because we are interested in the ultimate
causes of the emergence of hierarchy rather than proximal and particular mechanisms
1The demographic increase of the Neolithic transition has been first attributed to the higher pro-
ductivity of agriculture, which produces substantially more per unit of space than hunting (Bocquet-
Appel, 2011). However, this explanation has been recently challenged as agriculture also has a high labour
cost (Bowles, 2011) and health cost (Cohen and Crane-Kramer, 2007). The positive effect of agriculture
on group size might lie in social aspects of farming, with for instance a reduction in the costs of child
rearing.
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2. To connect the two major changes of the Neolithic transition, researchers have looked
closer to the behaviours of leaders. Leaders have two ambiguous facets, one despotic
side and one beneficial side. In a logical way, the theories built have followed the same
tendency and are mainly separated in two opposite arguments: the coercive and the
functional theories.
2.2.1 Coercive theories
Coercive theories (also called conflict theories) focus on the despotic facet of leader-
ship. They propose that hierarchy is imposed onto the group by dominant individuals
using coercive means such as physical dominance or coercive institutions (Summers,
2005; Earle, 1989). To explain the transition from egalitarian individuals to submit-
ted followers, coercive theories focus on the appearance of surplus resources brought
by agriculture. This section presents the approaches and results of the major coer-
cive theories: territorial circumscription, economic defensibility, patron-client and
reproductive skew.
2.2.1.1 The territorial circumscription theory
Territorial circumscription is a major coercive theory advanced by Carneiro (1970).
Using anthropological evidence, Carneiro (1970) claims that hierarchy occurs under
circumscribed conditions when one group manages to conquer, incorporate, and then
exploit the labour of another. A circumscribed environment is defined as favourable
environment, e.g. fertile lands or abundant fishing spots, delimited by unfavourable
environment either for ecological reasons such as mountains and desert — ecological
circumscription (Carneiro, 1970) — or social reasons such as high density of neighbours
villages — social circumscription. Because of such limits, the inhabitants of villages
submitted by war can not escape the invaders or at least, have a higher benefit by staying
in the favourable environment despite being exploited. Because the newly submitted
lands and villages need to be governed, an upper class of leaders is created from the
individuals of victorious villages. The lower class appeared from the prisoners of wars.
Carneiro (1970) claims that potential surplus is present in fertile lands but not exploited
before upper class force surplus production through taxation. The surplus resources
are then used to attract other workers and artisans forming the rest of the society. To
support this claim, Carneiro (1970) compares the Amazonian agriculturists with no
political unit - living in large space of cultivable land - and hierarchical Peruvian coast
villagers - living in a favourable environment surrounded by deserts and mountains and
2Proximate causes are the immediate and closest causes responsible for an event. Ultimate causes
are historical explanations, which via proximate causes, led to the event (Mayr, 1993). In biology, it is
considered that ultimate causes explain biological traits by the evolutionary forces acting on them, and
proximal causes focus on physiological and environmental factors (for an overview of different type of
explanation in biology, see Tinbergen 1963).
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social stratification. Kennett et al. (2009) extend the theory by using an ecological model,
which simulates the distribution of habitats to individuals. The authors apply this model
to archaeological data describing population on California’s Northern Channel Islands
during an extended period (3000 -200 BP). They find that the distribution of habitat fits
better the ideal despotic distribution rather than the ideal free distribution. In addition,
they identify the origin of hierarchy concomitant to severe droughts (environmental
circumscription) along with violent conflicts between villages. Similar approaches can
be found in literature which incorporate evolution (Arnold, 1993; Dye, 2009).
The territorial circumscription underlies an important mechanism. The level of
despotism is controlled by the capacity of followers to avoid domination, here the
capacity to escape the dominant. They show that this capacity is a function of the
cost of migration, which itself depends of the environmental factors and population
pressures. However, evidence on such extreme despotism born only from warfare are
rare. Filling this gap, some scientists proposed economical means as an alternative way
for leaders to build its domination.
2.2.1.2 The economic defensibility and patron-client theories
Models of economic defensibility and patron-clients both support the idea that lead-
ers build domination by monopolising economic opportunities. This theory was first
developed by economic defensibility models based on anthropological data and ecolo-
gical models (Boone, 1992; Brown, 1964; Dyson-Hudson and Alden Smith, 1978). It was
proposed by Brown (1964) that the defensibility of resources, i.e. how much resources
can be defended, is one of the most important determinants of territorial behaviours.
According to a similar model, territoriality is expected to occur when critical resources
are sufficiently abundant and predictable in space and time, so that costs of exclusive
use and defence of an area are outweighed by the benefits gained from resource con-
trol (Dyson-Hudson and Alden Smith, 1978). Defensible, abundant and predictable
are three features of resources brought by agriculture. Boone (1992) later applied this
theory to hierarchy by modelling the dynamics of group formation. This work shows
that followers would join despotic groups if unoccupied territory no longer exists. Par-
ticular individuals would exploit the lack of alternatives, as leverage to gain control of
resources at the expense of other. This results in a hierarchical social organisation based
on unequal access to resources.
The patron-client theory expands this work by showing how an initial inequality of
resources can be reinforced — or put in the words of Percy Bysshe Shelley, how “the
rich gets richer and the poor get poorer” (In A Defence of Poetry). Following a similar
line of thought than economic defensibility theories, patron-client theories claims that
hierarchy appears first from spatial variation in resources and land productivity (Smith
and Choi, 2007). They add that initial inequality can be exacerbated because some
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individuals (patrons) use their economic resources to develop the loyalty of followers
(clients) and receive back benefits under the form of labour or other support (Eisenstadt
and Roniger, 1980; Chabot-Hanowell and Smith, 2012; Smith and Choi, 2007). In the
long term, the labour produced by followers secures the economic power of leaders
and leads to institutionalised leadership. Patrons can also use their economic power
to build up their dominance, through alliance formation with leaders of other groups.
Patron-client theories stress that the variation in economical power can come from any
resources such as technological innovation (Roscoe, 2006; Ames, 2003; Arnold, 2010) or
trading networks (Chabot-Hanowell and Smith, 2012).
Economic defensibility and patron-client theories show how inequality in habitat
quality can become inequality of resources and get later reinforced by exchange of
wealth and labour. However, they consider that inequality first appears because of
the patchiness of habitat, despite this variation between habitat being already present
before the Neolithic transition. The appearance of surplus resources could answer this
point but it is still hard to see how some individuals would have accumulated large
amount of resources in a group of egalitarian zealots. Before coming back to this critic,
we present a more general coercive theory which integrate these explanations and
factors in a broader framework: the reproductive skew theory.
2.2.1.3 The reproductive skew theory
The previous models have been expanded by a generalised theory: the reproductive
skew theory. This theory focus on the “distribution of reproduction”, which describes
how much the offspring of a generation is produced by the individuals from previous
generation. It ranges from each individual having an equal number of offspring to one
individual producing all the offspring. The “reproductive skew” describes the skewed
distribution of reproduction in a group either due to direct inequality, e.g. access to
mates or indirect inequality, e.g. access to resources (Keller, 1994).
Models of the reproductive skew theory study the evolution of traits of a dominant
individual which modulates its exploitation of followers. On the one hand, increasing
its exploitation of followers provides more resources and thus a higher reproductive suc-
cess. On the other hand, reducing its exploitation of followers can be beneficial because
it provides to followers staying incentives (reproduction conceded to subordinates to
prevent their departure) or peace incentives (reproduction conceded to subordinates
to prevent them from fighting for supremacy with the dominant). Reproductive skew
models can then calculate the skewness of the reproduction distribution – the level of
inequality – by looking at the value of the traits which maximise the inclusive fitness of
the dominant, i.e. its fitness and fitness of related individuals.
These models were first developed by Vehrencamp (1983) and inspired by previous
arguments concerning the conflicting relationship between followers’ options for dis-
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persal and the ability of dominants to monopolise reproduction (Alexander, 1974). Later
works expand the model of Vehrencamp (1983) and be categorised in two categories:
transactional models and compromise models. Transactional models focus on the
trade-off between exploitation by the dominant and groups stability (for review see Bus-
ton et al. 2007). Transactional models consider that leaders have some form of control
on followers. However, the leader has to temper its domination to prevent the departure
of followers. That is because the departure of followers from the group reduces the total
productivity of the group, and ultimately the absolute amount of resources extracted by
the dominant. The level of reproductive skew depends on the reproductive benefits of
being in a group, the ecological constraints and the relatedness between the dominant
and followers (Johnstone, 2000). The second type of model, compromise models (or
tug-of-war models), focuses on the trade-off between exploitation by the dominant
and cost of conflicts. Compromise models estimate that the dominant have a limited
ability to impose its domination and thus, the skewness of the reproduction distribution
is a compromise depending of the ability of dominant and followers to impose their
interests (Cant, 1998; Reeve et al., 1998; Buston and Zink, 2009). In these models, the
relative competitive ability of the followers and the relatedness between the dominant
and followers are the main determinant of the distribution of the reproduction.
Johnstone (2000) suggested a synthetic perspective that combines considerations of
group stability (as in transactional models) with the struggle for the control of reproduc-
tion (as in compromise models). Its result indicates that the conclusions of previous
models are bound to vary in relation of the the extent of dominant control, the threat of
departure and the possibility of eviction.
In short, reproductive skew theory sees social organisation as the equilibrium state
between (i) the capacity of the dominant to appropriate resources and mating partners
and (ii) the capacity of followers to avoid the domination. Reproductive skew models
have been able to synthesise previous coercive theories into a generalised framework
to study the evolution of despotism. We have presented here few of their key meth-
ods and results but more extensive reviews can be found (Summers, 2005; Johnstone,
2000; Keller, 1994). To summarise, reproductive skew theory predicts that the level of
inequality is dependant to the:
• ecological constraints and opportunities for independent breeding;
• group productivity as a function of group size;
• genetic relatedness of group members;
• the fighting abilities of dominants and followers;
Reproductive skew models have the benefit to clearly link the different environmental
factors to the level of inequality. They do that by using a formal mathematical approach
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grounded in the theory of evolution. However, reproductive skew models have been
criticised because of the lack of consensus in their predictions. For instance, two
subtypes of reproductive skew models (concession models Vehrencamp 1983; Reeve
and Ratnieks 1993 and restraints models Johnstone and Cant 1999) yield opposed
predictions on the effects of group productivity benefits, opportunities for independent
breeding and relatedness on inequality (Johnstone, 2000). In addition, some of the
predictions have either failed to be supported by data, or found hard to test because of
the difficulty to measure some factors in real world (Nonacs and Hager, 2011). Finally,
their applicability to human societies is limited. In particular, reproductive skew models
often consider groups of two when Neolithic societies could go up to thousands of
individuals. As an example, reproductive skew models usually assume that followers
have complete information on their benefit to stay in the group, which is very unlikely
in large groups. When Kokko (2003) relaxed the assumption of complete knowledge,
the evolutionary stability of reproductive skew models disappeared.
2.2.1.4 Coercive theories: summary
Coercive theories state that despotic hierarchy is the result of coercive domination
by leaders. The level of despotism is determined by the capacity of the leaders to
impose this domination by using physical dominance, economic control and coercive
institutions and the capacity of followers to avoid this domination by leaving the group
or fighting against the dominant. Coercive theories shed light onto a major mechanism
and successfully encompass one facet of leadership. However, coercive theories fail to
explain how some individuals acquired such power in the first place. Coercive theories
usually advance the argument of inequality being already present in the quality of
habitats but then why such inequality was not present in pre-Neolithic egalitarian
hunter-gatherers? This paradox is commonly solved by the advent of agriculture which
led to the creation of defensible and transmissible surplus resources. Yet, if the leaders
use surpluses to build up control, it is hard to see why followers would not have stopped
them. The development of hierarchy appears before institutions of coercion such as
military or police, and follows a long period where followers successfully controlled the
dominant individuals. In addition, the high labour cost of the first form of agriculture
would have limited the proportion of surplus available (Bowles, 2011). As a result,
coercive theories seem to not fully explain the evolution of leadership but only the
transition from hierarchy to despotism. Indeed, they fail to explain the emergence of
beneficial leaders despite this facet being backed up by empirical evidence (Van Vugt
et al., 2007; Van Vugt et al., 2011). Interestingly, the theory advanced by Carneiro (1970)
states that leaders have appeared because large groups needed to be organised. Chabot-
Hanowell and Smith (2012) also argues that group resources defence is a collective
action problem. Wittfogel (1957) proposed in its hydraulic empire hypothesis that
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hierarchical government structure emerges through the need of central coordination to
control irrigation systems and floods. Many coercive models recognise leaders emerging
because of the benefit they brought to the group, although they do not elaborate on this
aspect. This facet of leadership has been well explored by the second type of theories:
functional theories.
2.2.2 Functional theories
Functional theories (or voluntaristic theories) focus on the manager facet of leadership.
They propose that hierarchy is a mutually beneficial system between leaders and follow-
ers (Service, 1975; Diehl, 2000; Van Vugt et al., 2011). The costs of exploitation by leaders
are balanced by the greater benefits that leaders provide as organisers, monitors or
contributors. To explain the transition from egalitarian to hierarchy, functional theories
focus on the demographic increase resulting from the advent of agriculture and the
new social challenges it brought. We review here the models which assume that the
beneficial roles of leaders have been the driver of evolution of leadership 3. It is worth
noting that it also encompasses models which consider despotic leaders but that do
not focus on this facet.
2.2.2.1 Leaders contribute to the public good
An important part of the success of human groups rely on their capacity to cooperate to
produce and manage public goods. Leaders with their large amount of wealth, could be
a valuable asset to the production of these public goods. Gavrilets and Fortunato (2014)
have developed a model studying how inequality of resources affects the contribution of
individuals to a collective action. They show that in unequal groups, leaders benefit to
the group by contributing a large part of the effort required to produce resources. This
is because leaders compete with leaders of other groups during intergroup conflicts.
Leaders in groups which successfully tackle collective task, have a higher chance to win
and thus, to get a higher fitness than other leaders. Yet, the model does not investigate
the evolution of hierarchy by itself but rather how inequality can solve social dilemma
in collective action problem. It is still not clear how this form of inequality would have
evolved in the first place.
2.2.2.2 Leaders monitor and punish defectors
A major difficulty in large social groups is to maintain cooperation between individuals
(Powers and Lehmann, 2017). A subset of functional theories proposes that leaders
3Please note that we did not integrate the theory of service-for-prestige in this review (Price and
Van Vugt, 2014). This is because the contribution of this theory is to explain the presence of leaders in
small-scale societies, rather than leaders as observed in post-Neolithic societies. This theory proposes
similar processes than coercive theories to explain the emergence of leaders with higher amount of
resources, knowingly the capacity of followers to leave the group or to fight back the leaders.
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maintain cooperation by monitoring and punishing defectors. Indeed, punishment
of defectors is an efficient method to maintain cooperation within a group (Boyd and
Richerson, 1992). However, punishment itself has a cost and it is advantageous for an
individual to let other individuals pay this cost. It leads to a second order free-rider
problem, and can lead to the disappearance of punishment and cooperation (Fowler,
2005).
Hooper et al. (2010) built an evolutionary model where leaders play a role of mon-
itors and punishers 4. Using an evolutionary game theory framework, the authors
show that a supervising leader is a preferred solution to the problem of free riding in
large cooperative groups. In other words, an increase in group size as observed at the
Neolithic transition would lead to the transition from mutual monitoring to appointed
monitoring. This can be explained by individuals abandoning mutual monitoring and
mutual punishment in large groups because group size dilutes the individual benefit
of punishment. In large groups, paying fee to a leader is a less costly mean to enforce
cooperation and enjoy its benefits.
In the model of Hooper et al. (2010), leaders accept to pay the cost of punishment
because they are compensated by a higher share of the public good produced. This
results in leaders having a final similar pay-off than other members of the groups. Later
on, Hooper et al. (2015) expand his model to take in account ecological factors and show
that their previous results hold even with inequality. In a similar way, Smith and Choi
(2007) have developed a model where leaders are appointed monitors and compared
it to a patron-client model. They find that both scenarios are capable of producing
hierarchy with marked and stable inequality in resources.
These models of evolution of leadership and monitoring show that leaders can be a
solution to maintain cooperation. Hierarchy would emerge because followers benefit
from the cooperation enforced by leaders. However, it is still hard to conclude how much
this explanation applies in real world. First, evidence contests the prevalence of costly
punishment to enforce cooperation in human societies (Guala, 2012). For instance,
hunter-gatherers prefer to stop interacting with defectors rather than punishing them
directly (Baumard, 2010). Second, a recent analysis of a large set of anthropological
studies did not find strong evidence for the role of leaders as sanctioning free-riders
(Garfield et al., 2019a). Third, appointed monitoring could also be limited by high group
size. Indeed, the capacity of a leader to monitor everyone is clearly limited by the size
of the group and surely impossible in large post-Neolithic societies. Evidence shows
that human tend to choose a more economic way by creating set of rules also known as
institutions (Ostrom, 1990). These rules are often designed in a way that monitoring is
easily done by other individuals and the punishment is enforced by a specific group of
individuals. Although leaders are present at the head of the punishing institutions, their
4This model has also been extended in an agent-based model and successfully tested on anthropolo-
gical data describing Pueblo societies of the northern US Southwest (Kohler et al., 2012)
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involvement in the task itself are usually limited to managing these institutions. In the
same vein of evidence, another major part of the literature proposed that leaders fulfil
another role: organisers.
2.2.2.3 Leaders organise collective actions
Even if individuals are willing to cooperate, they need to agree how. Collective actions,
e.g. to hunt in group, to build a monument or to fight in a battle, require that individuals
coordinate their actions (Cooper, 1999). For instance, a group needs to decide of the
distribution of the roles or the schedule of their actions to be efficient. It has been
proposed that leaders could bring benefit to the group by facilitating group organisation
and coordination (Calvert, 1992).
Leader-follower as a solution to coordination problems appears already in dyadic
interactions (King et al., 2009). Evolutionary game theory shows that most of coordina-
tion problems between two individuals can be solved by a single coordination game in
which individual has to choose between the strategies lead or follow (for an example,
see producer-scrounger models Barnard and Sibly 1981; Rands et al. 2003; Giraldeau
and Livoreil 1998).
Johnstone and Manica (2011) proposed a model based on game theory to explore
the emergence of leaders in a population faced to coordination problems. They define
individuals by an intrinsic value of influence which determines the probability of an
individual to choose their own preference or to copy the preference of another inter-
acting individual. The individuals interact in repeated coordination game in which
choosing the same strategy carry the largest output. Their results show that natural
selection leads to stable dimorphism with the presence at equilibrium of individuals
with low influence, i.e. followers and individual with high influence, i.e. leaders. These
results are explained by the trait of leadership being advantageous when a majority of
individuals are followers (and vice versa). This model successfully demonstrates how
coordination costs can lead to the evolution of leadership because of the benefits it
provides to individuals. However, these models do not consider the case where leaders
get more resources than followers, which is the main limit of functional explanations of
the emergence of leadership. In addition, they consider small group size (maximum of
10) at which humans can easily solve coordination games by communicating with each
other.
Powers and Lehmann (2014) developed a theoretical model of evolution of lead-
ership taking in account the additional benefit of being leader and high group size.
Their results show that it is possible to obtain the evolution of stable preferences toward
hierarchical organisation and thus the emergence of hierarchy. Importantly, this result
holds in presence of inequality, i.e. with leaders receiving more resources than followers.
The authors explain this result by a feedback loop between social organisation and
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group size. The average higher production in hierarchical groups leads to hierarchical
group being bigger. In return, these groups can produce larger amount of resources by
economy of scale 5. However, these large groups also have more difficulties to organise.
As follows, the advantage of having hierarchy in these large groups is higher. This feed-
back loop ultimately leads to the evolution of groups with stable hierarchy and high
group size. These groups spread hierarchical organisation by sending a larger number
of migrants to other groups. The authors also show (as seen in coercive theories) that
leaders temper their level of despotism to prevent the departure of unsatisfied followers
and then maintain a higher total production of resources on which the leader will take a
share. The work of Powers and Lehmann (2014) shows that the emergence of hierarchy
can be explained by the facilitating role of leaders on group organisation. In particular,
they shed light on how the demographic increase can interact with the evolution of
hierarchy. In addition, their results on the level of inequality confirm results of coercive
theories and show that both processes are compatible. However, this model applies to
institutional hierarchy but does not explain how leadership would have evolved before
the advent of institution such as voting systems.
2.2.2.4 Functional theories: summary
Functional theories state that hierarchy is the result of benefits brought by leaders. Be-
cause leaders reduce defection in the group and help organise large-scale cooperation,
followers voluntarily choose hierarchical groups even at the cost of relative domina-
tion. As we have seen, models identify the size of the group as a main factor. Indeed,
an increase in the size of the group lead to the failure of small-scale mechanisms to
maintain cooperation (Powers and Lehmann, 2017) and an exponential increase in the
cost of organisation (Johnson, 1982). Functional theories underly a major mechanism
which successfully encompasses one facet of hierarchy. However, functional models
fail to explain the evolution of high level of despotism as seen in archaeological record.
In addition, the arguments advanced to explain the spread of functional hierarchy are
struggling to explain the emergence of hierarchy only from the evolution of individuals
and in absence of political institutions.
2.3 The iron law of oligarchy
On the one hand, coercive theories successfully explain the emergence of despotism
in which dominant leaders exploit submitted followers. They identify an important
equilibrium between capacity to impose domination and capacity to avoid it, and
how environmental factors can affect these. However, coercive theories fail to explain
5Economy of scale describes the fact that an increase in the scale of an operation (here group size) is
translated into a superlinear increase in the benefit produced by the operation Pindyck and Rubinfeld,
2001
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how leaders have developed dominance in the first place and overlook the extensive
evidence of leaders’ beneficial roles in the group. On the other hand, functional the-
ories successfully explain the evolution of mutualistic leaders and their acceptance by
followers. They identify major mechanisms such as the role of leaders in monitoring
defectors and facilitating group coordination. However, functional theories rely on
particular conditions and overlook the development of despotic behaviours. In truth,
both sides agree on a multi variant explanation of the evolution of hierarchy. Rather
than ignoring the other side, coercive and functional theories appear to be looking at dif-
ferent properties of leaders. Coercive theories focus on inequality in term of resources.
Functional theories focus on inequality of power, which leaders use to benefit the group.
However, there are only few models which encompass the evolution of both inequality
(Powers and Lehmann, 2014; Hooper et al., 2010; Hooper et al., 2015). Nonetheless,
inequality of power and resources could be strongly connected. For instance, power
over others’ behaviour or collective decision could be an efficient way for a leader to
build up economic advantage.
To find such theory, we now temporarily walk away from the evolutionary biology
literature to take a glimpse in the large amount of research conducted by sociologists
and political scientists. These fields have for long try to understand the mechanisms
and processes underlying the distribution of power. One particular theory seems to
fulfil the previous gap by proposing the emergence of hierarchy and despotism from a
same property, inequality of influence (Michels, 1911). We now present this theory and
draw the parallel between it and previous theories studied in evolutionary sciences.
The “iron law of oligarchy” is a theory from political sciences, which has been pro-
posed a century ago by Robert Michels (Michels, 1911). Building on his disappointing
experiences as member of a political party in the early 20th, Michels proposes that any
human organisations, however democratically committed they can be, will inevitably
fall into an oligarchic organisation 6 (Michels, 1911). In other words, human groups are
bound by an iron law to end up as an oligarchy. More interestingly for this thesis is the
process that Michels proposes to explain how groups would switch from egalitarian to
oligarchy. First, he states that large-scale groups are constrained by high costs of organ-
isation and thus require to entrust the decision-making to a minority of individuals if
they want to function efficiently. In order to facilitate decision-making, this minority
will be given power and authority over other individuals. Once few individuals have a
large power over group decisions, it is in their interest to use this power to maintain
and develop their domination. This minority of individual will then do whatever it is
necessary to maintain their position and block any opposition, ultimately overpassing
democracy. At the end, the group is an oligarchy, in which the structure of power is an
end in itself rather than a mean.
6Oligarchy is here defined as a concentration of illegitimate power in the hands of an entrenched
minority (Leach, 2005).
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This theory has been built upon a large set of evidence and is still nowadays a
recognised theory in political sciences (for a short review, see Leach 2015; Tolbert 2010).
How does this theory fits with evolutionary theories of hierarchy? It draws interesting
parallels but it also adds important subtleties. As functional theories, the iron law of
oligarchy states that leaders emerge to reduce the cost of organisation. Nonetheless, it
narrows the role of leaders to collective decision-making, which would be facilitated by
the concentration of power into few individuals. As coercive theories, the iron law of
oligarchy states that once an individual has build up dominance, this individual will use
it to strengthen its position and exploit others. Nonetheless, it proposes that an excess
of political power, i.e. power over collective decisions, is enough for leaders to impose
their domination, rather than a fighting or economic advantage. Crucially, the iron law
of oligarchy combines coercive and functional theories and explain the emergence of
hierarchy and despotism. It proposes that both sides emerge from a same inequality:
inequality of influence.
Nonetheless, the iron law of oligarchy also has been the target of a number of
criticisms. In particular, new evidence on other human organisation rose concerns on
the generality of this law. The main criticisms denote three parts of the iron law which
lack of explanation:
• Why do large-scale organisations need to centralise power in order to be effective
(Breines, 1980; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986)? Some organisations, e.g. cooperative
and worker’s collectives, have exhibited egalitarian and democratic organisation.
• How does the political power owned by leaders provide them with a mean to
exploit others? Marxist scholars claim that leaders require economic power and
control of the means of production rather than political power (Bukharin, 1925;
Hook and Hook, 1933),
• Why would leaders necessarily become despotic (Edelstein, 1967; Schumpeter,
1942)? First, it is not clear what is the force driving leaders to dominate others.
Second, there have been example of groups where despotism is limited because
the minority is still accountable to majority 7.
These criticisms have shown that the iron law of oligarchy might not apply to all
human groups, or at least that the iron law applies in more particular conditions than
the ones initially stated. These criticisms have been hard to answer because the iron
law of oligarchy lacks of a more formal description. As a result, most of criticisms are
new evidence contradicting the predictions of the iron law of oligarchy, rather than
criticisms on the law itself, i.e. the causal links it proposes. It is then hard to see if the law
needs to be totally rejected or if some parts of the law need to be refined. In particular,
7This critic is based on examples of groups in modern human societies but it draws an interesting
parallel with the egalitarian norms observed in tribes of hunter-gatherers
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the iron law of oligarchy describes the change in individuals and societies with time,
but yet lacks of a formal description of how individuals change. For instance, it is hard
to answer why would leaders develop despotic behaviours if we do not consider the
rules by which leaders’ behaviours change with time.
In this thesis, we argue that an evolutionary point of view can answer these criticisms
or at least provide means to investigate them. This is because evolution provides a
precise and formal description of a missing mechanism, how individuals change with
time. The theories that we have presented earlier already answer some of the gaps of
the iron law of oligarchy. For instance, the question of “why would leaders develop
despotic behaviours” is easy to answer when looking at it through the lens of natural
selection. Coercive theories show that despotism provides an evolutionary benefit to
leaders because leaders get a higher amount of resources and so a higher amount of
offspring. With time, the numerous offspring of despotic leaders will replace the fewer
offspring of a more tempered leader. In addition, reproductive skew theory clearly
identifies the effects of different factors on this level of despotism. Another gap of
the iron law of oligarchy is to explain “why would a bigger group necessarily lead to
the concentration of power in a minority”. If we consider that leaders facilitate group
organisation, functional theories show that hierarchy will evolve because followers
present in a group with leader will exhibit a higher fitness than followers in other groups.
Ultimately, it creates a selection pressure toward hierarchy. Yet, this explanation does
not solve totally the problem because this selection pressure can be counterbalanced by
the competition between individuals of the same group, which pushes every individual
to become leader. However, the evolutionary point of view narrows down the problem
to a measurable and well known problem in evolutionary biology (Frank, 1998).
In its recent review of the iron law of oligarchy, Leach (2015) states that: “Despite over
a century of empirical research in a range of subfields in political science and sociology,
however, there is still no consensus about whether or under what conditions Michels’
claim holds true”. Evolution theory is able to fill this gap because it describes precisely
the relation between environmental factors and changes in human behaviours. The
approach of evolutionary dynamics reinterprets problems in term of cost and benefit to
measure in which direction selection forces drive change. The mechanistic approach
of this framework, combined to its mathematical description provides the mean to
create precise predictions, which would describe under which conditions the iron law
of oligarchy will hold. In return, the iron law of oligarchy provides a new hypothesis
strongly supported by evidence for the field of evolution of hierarchy.
Thus, we propose in this thesis an evolutionary iron law of oligarchy. The evol-
utionary iron law of oligarchy proposes a formal model of the iron law of oligarchy,
based on a well-accepted body of theory. Following the iron law of oligarchy, we define
hierarchy by the distribution of individual capacity to influence collective decision. The
evolutionary iron law of oligarchy describes the evolution of this trait, influence, and
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explain how it creates inequality of power and resources. The scenario proposed by
the theory is that an increase in group size leads to a skewed distribution of influence.
This is because a skewed distribution of influence facilitates collective decision-making
and thus, increases the reproductive success of the members of the groups. Once in
place, influential leaders evolve despotic behaviour and create economic inequality.
This is because they can use their influence to bias the collective decisions and increase
their reproductive success. They bypass the watch of egalitarian members of the group
by biasing their opinions. This scenario is testable using an evolutionary dynamics
framework, which describes the different selection forces and how they are affected by
the environmental factors. We propose in this thesis to build models which represent
this scenario and investigate if this scenario holds.
However, there is still one process lacking of a formal description. The iron law of
oligarchy proposes that the benefit of leaders emerge from collective decision-making.
But how to model collective decision-making and in particular the effect of the distri-
bution of influence on it? Fortunately, such dynamics have been studied by a different
field. Statistical physics have developed models which describe how individuals reach
consensus. We argue that these models might provide the last missing block to create
models of the evolutionary iron law of oligarchy.
2.4 Modelling consensus decision-making with opinion
formation models
The social dynamics of groups have been studied by the field of statistical physics
using opinion formation models. Opinion formation models are theoretical models,
which combine physics and mathematics tools to social and psychological evidence.
Although the concerned literature do not explicitly talk about leadership, we propose
that opinion formation models actually provide crucial insight in the role of leaders in
group organisation.
Opinion formation models describe a population of individuals by their opinions,
the capacity of individuals to transmit their opinions and the possible interactions. At
each time step, the model simulates update events during which, one individual shares
its opinion to other individuals. The listeners then modify their opinions according
to the opinion of the speaker, modulated by some characteristics of the speaker and
themselves. Opinion formation models usually focus on the possibility to reach a
consensus, on the time to reach it and the final decision as a function of the network
structure. One of the first and perhaps most studied discrete opinion formation model is
the voter model (Clifford and Sudbury, 1973; Holley and Liggett, 1975). Here, individuals
are characterised by a binary state variable and, on each time step, a randomly chosen
individual adopts, or “copies”, the state of one of its neighbours. Worth citing is also the
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Deffuant model, which extends voter model to continuous opinions (Deffuant et al.,
2000).
Opinion formation models provide a mechanistic description of collective decision-
making. Hierarchy can be integrated in these models by considering that individuals
can differ in their capacity to transmit their opinions. Studying the effect of hierarchy
on collective decision-making is then studying the effect of heterogeneity of individual
characteristics on collective decision-making. That is why if the extensive literature
on opinion formation models have been reviewed (Baxter et al., 2008; Baxter et al.,
2012; Blythe, 2010), we will focus now on the study of heterogeneous opinion formation
models.
First, heterogeneity can be integrated by considering that some individuals are
stubborn and do not want to change their opinions. Masuda et al. (2010) develop the
partisan voter model in which each individual has an innate and fixed preference for
one of two possible opinion states. They show that the presence of these individuals
slow down the time to reach consensus. Mobilia (2003); Mobilia et al. (2007) introduced
a voter model with “zealots”, i.e. individuals that always maintain its opinion. Their
results indicate that the presence of a zealot can strongly bias the final average opinion.
Their model also shows that zealots can have a negative effect by potentially preventing
the group to reach consensus. Galam and Jacobs (2007) found similar result in an
opinion formation model where individuals update their opinions as a function of the
local majority. To summarise, the presence of stubborn individuals appears to bias the
overall opinion and to slow down the consensus.
On the other hand, Sood et al. (2008) show that heterogeneity can be beneficial.
They generalise emblematic opinion formation models - voter models and invasion
process - to heterogeneous networks. They found that consensus is reached faster
when the degree distribution is broad and that some individuals have a high number
of neighbour. Pérez-Llanos et al. (2018) studied an opinion formation model in which
individuals differ in their capacities of persuasion and zealotry (opposite of stubborn-
ness). They show using an analytical approach that the time to reach consensus can be
reduced by having a number of stubborn agents. Gavrilets et al. (2016) have developed
an opinion formation where they investigate the effect of persuasiveness, stubborness
and talkativeness (represented by reputation) on the time to consensus. Leaders can
then be described as individuals with high stubbornness and high persuasiveness and
followers as the opposite. The main results of their model demonstrate that the time
to consensus is highly dependant of the heterogeneity in stubbornness and persuas-
iveness of individuals, e.g. the presence of few stubborn individuals can strongly slow
down the consensus. Interestingly, they show that a high diversity of stubborness, per-
suasiveness and talkativeness can lead to very short or long time to reach consensus.
They suggest that the shortest time appears when there is a minority of leaders and a
majority of followers. However, they have a limited exploration of the effect of leaders
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and followers on this time to consensus because they look at the effect of the diversity
(range of possible values) rather than the effect of distribution of these characterist-
ics. Finally, Jalili (2013) developed a continuous opinion formation where individuals
are characterised by a social power. Social power is equivalent to the capacity of an
individual to change someone else opinion, i.e. persuasion. Importantly, they do not
consider that consensus has to be reached but rather measure the size of the biggest
group who reached consensus. Using this model, Jalili (2013) showed that when social
power is asymmetrically distributed and concentrated in the individual with the highest
number of social connection, the consensus is improved with the largest cluster at
the end of consensus moving from 30 to 85%. Importantly, it does not work on other
network structure in which there is not large differences in number of social links. Thus,
it suggests that talkativeness is as important as persuasiveness.
Overall, these opinion formation models demonstrate that heterogeneity in opinion
formation models can have different effects. First, the presence of stubborn, talkative
and persuasive individuals bias the collective decisions. Second, it can slow down or
speed up the time a group spend to reach consensus. However, general conclusion on
the effects of different distributions of these characteristics on the time to consensus is
still lacking. In addition, the presence of different characteristics and the hidden effect
of network structure (network structure can affect the interactions possible but also the
probability of speaking) limits comparison between the models.
To summarise, theories on the evolution of social hierarchy either successfully
explain the despotic or mutualistic side of hierarchy. Although they recognised the
importance of both sides, for instance organisation to explain the first emergence of
leaders or coercion to shift to despotism, they struggle to integrate them in a com-
prehensive model. The iron law of oligarchy proposes a scenario which unifies both
functional and coercive theory but yet, this theory lacks of a formal investigation. Thus,
we propose an evolutionary iron law of oligarchy, which reinterprets the previous theory
with an evolutionary perspective. To do so, we combine models of social dynamics
and evolutionary dynamics. On the one hand, opinion formation models describe the
decision-making process and the effect of the distribution of influence on it. On the
other hand, evolutionary models describes how the traits affecting influence would
change with time. Using these models, we aim to show if an evolutionary iron law of
oligarchy is a viable scenario to explain the emergence of hierarchy and despotism, and
under which conditions this scenario would hold.
38
[ Third Chapter \
The effects of hierarchy on collective
decision-making
One of the core postulate of ”the iron law of oligarchy” is that hierarchy facilitates group
organisation. Yet, it lacks a mechanistic model describing how the presence of leaders
and followers could provide this organisational benefit. We propose that leaders could
reduce costs of organisation by reducing the time a group spend to reach consensus
(consensus time in short). The consensus time is costly because groups that take too
long to reach a decision may lose resources or eventually fail the collective task, e.g.
no decision taken before a battle starts. In this chapter, we model collective decision-
making to investigate the effect of the distribution of influence on the time a group
spend to reach consensus.
3.1 Contribution
In this Chapter 3, we demonstrate that skewness in the distribution of influence is
enough to reduce the consensus time and scalar stress, i.e. the increase of consensus
time as group size increases. In addition, our results show that hierarchy with an
influential single leader leads to bigger reduction in (i) the consensus time, (ii) the
variation in the consensus time, and (iii) the increase in consensus time as group size
increases.
3.2 Publications
A part of the work in this chapter has been published as:
• Cedric Perret, Simon T.Powers and Emma Hart, Emergence of hierarchy from
the evolution of individual influence in an agent-based model, Proceedings of
Artificial Life Conference 2017, MIT Press, 2017
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• Cedric Perret, Emma Hart and Simon T.Powers Being a leader or being the leader:
The evolution of institutionalised hierarchy, Proceedings of Artificial Life Confer-
ence 2019, MIT Press, 2019
In addition, a part of the work presented in this chapter has been submitted as:
• Cedric Perret, Emma Hart and Simon T.Powers, Disorganised equality or efficient
despotism: How group size drives the evolution of hierarchy in human societies,
Proceedings of Royal Society B: Biological sciences. Submitted in 2019.
3.3 Introduction
Leaders appear to play an important role in organising collective task whether it is
collective hunting (Alvard and Gillespie, 2004) or state management. Unlike hunter-
gatherer leaders who temporarily lead in situations in which they are knowledgeable,
leaders of post-Neolithic hierarchies are permanent and take decisions about a wide
range of topics. It suggests that leaders play a role in organisation beside their know-
ledge, a suggestion that is supported by leaders effectiveness and emergence being
correlated with intrinsic capacities to “lead”, e.g. talkativeness, charisma (Judge et al.,
2002). However, it is still not clear how leaders provide such benefit. For instance, lead-
ers could facilitate inter-individual communication, control defectors (Hooper et al.,
2010), or inspire followers (Bass, 1990).
One of the main candidate to explain the organisational benefit provided by leaders
is that leaders could facilitate coordination (Calvert, 1992). To realise a collective action,
individuals need to choose their actions in regard to other individuals’ actions (Cooper,
1999). For instance, to hunt a large game collectively, individuals need to choose their
roles, their positions, their future movements and adapt all of these as a function of the
reactions of the animal.
The difficulty of coordination problems is that an individual needs to find what
other individuals are doing, in order to adapt their own actions. In addition, other
individuals would do the same reasoning and potentially update their behaviours at the
same time. When the task tackled is sufficiently common and repeated, coordination
problems can be solved by cultural evolution, by which the best strategy becomes
more common because it is more transmitted than others (Boyd and Richerson, 1985).
However, individuals can not rely on cultural evolution when the task is novel or if the
characteristics of the coordination problem change often. In these cases, individuals
can learn the optimal strategy by trial and error (Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1960). This can
carry large costs because it requires many mistakes, in particular in large groups. Thus,
study on the role of leaders in coordination problems have often been focused on the
capacity of leaders to take the right decision, to make the group take the right decision
40
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF HIERARCHY ON COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
or to enforce the decision taken (Calvert, 1992). However, it is unlikely that the cost of
coordination in humans lies in the mistakes done during the learning process. Humans
are able to bypass the trial and error process by communicating with each other to
find the optimal strategy. It suggests that the cost of coordination lies in the time spent
in communicating and agreeing on a collective strategy. The presence of stubborn
individuals or partisans of one strategy can stretch the time the group spend to reach
consensus (Mobilia et al., 2007; Galam and Jacobs, 2007). Although this consensus
time is negligible in small groups, it can become fairly consequent in large groups
because of the number of individuals which needs to coordinate and because of the
increasing probability of the presence of stubborn individuals (Gavrilets et al., 2016).
This time spent to agree on a common decision is costly because the time itself carries
a cost, e.g. resources get depleted, or because time constraints can force individuals to
take a sub-optimal decision, e.g. a quick decision has to be taken during battle. In the
worst case, the collective task can be abandoned for example, when individuals have an
outside option such as in a stag-hunt game (Skyrms, 2003).
Psychological evidence suggests that leaders are skilled communicators and could
use these skills to quickly lead the group to a consensus. For instance, experiments
show that verbal communication (Mullen et al., 1989) or extraversion (Judge et al., 2002)
are consistent predictors of leadership emergence. Although collective decision-making
has been widely studied (for review, see Castellano et al. 2009), there is limited work
exploring the relation between individuals’ capacities to communicate and consensus
time. Notably, Gavrilets et al. (2016) have developed a model simulating collective
decision-making where they investigate the effect of persuasiveness, stubborness and
talkativeness (represented by reputation) on the consensus time. They show that hetero-
geneity can impact the consensus time and for instance, a high diversity of stubborness,
persuasiveness and talkativeness can lead to very short or long consensus time. How-
ever, the model provides a limited exploration of the effect of leaders and followers
on this consensus time because it looks at the effect of the diversity (range of possible
values) rather than the effect of distribution of these communication skills.
We extend the model of Gavrilets et al. (2016) to investigate more deeply the role of
influence in collective decision-making. Following previous works (Gavrilets et al., 2016)
and psychology experiments (Judge et al., 2002), we incorporate three traits: persuas-
iveness, stubborness and talktativeness under one trait, influence. We do so because
we are interested in measuring the effect of leaders on consensus time rather than the
effect of each trait. These three traits are correlated and observed in leader profiles. For
instance, psychology experiments suggest that both the quantity (talkativeness) and
quality (persuasiveness) of communication are important to identify the leaders (Jones
and Kelly, 2007). Using this definition of influence, we aim to answer the following
question:
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Research question. Does a skewed distribution of influence within a group reduce the
time to reach consensus?
3.4 Model definition
We developed an opinion formation model based on previous work (Deffuant et al.,
2000; Gavrilets et al., 2016). It is a model which consists of a sequence of discussions
between individuals until their opinions are close enough, i.e. the group has reached
a global consensus. Opinion formation models are well-known tools to study social
dynamics (Castellano et al., 2009).
Individuals are described by an opinion x, which is a continuous value defined
between [0,1]. The opinion x describes a generic opinion of an individual on how to
realise a collective task, e.g. next raid target, plan of an irrigation system or value of a
law. Each time step is defined by one discussion event during which one individual, the
speaker, talks to multiple individuals, the listeners. The individuals repeat the previous
step until consensus is reached, i.e. the standard deviation of the opinions is less than a
threshold. The number of discussion events that occurred to reach consensus is called
the consensus time.
The novelty of the model is to explicitly describe individual capacity to influence
the collective decision α (in short influence), which is a continuous value defined
between [0,1]. The trait α represents the influence of an individual and affects (i) the
capacity of one individual to modify the opinion of another individual towards its own
opinion, (ii) the reluctance of an individual to change its opinion, and (iii) the probability
that an individual talks to other individuals. These three traits, i.e. persuasiveness,
stubbornness and talkativeness, are highly correlated in leaders personalities (Judge
et al., 2002) and are the key factors in explaining how leaders reduce consensus time
(Gavrilets et al., 2016). Influence represents a set of behavioural traits that affect the
influence of an individual, such as extraversion, boldness, and charisma. To study the
effect of social organisation on collective decision-making, we divide individuals into
two profiles: leader L, and follower F. Each profile has a fixed value of influence α such
that αL >αF.
We consider a population of N individuals. At the beginning of the opinion forma-
tion model, the values of opinion x are sampled from the uniform distribution between
[0,1]. Doing so, we consider that individuals strongly differ in which decision should
be taken. This scenario applies either when (i) the interests of individuals do not align
or when (ii) the optimal decision is not known (or not trivial to guess). If both of these
conditions are not fulfilled, it is likely that the group would reach a quick consensus, and
thus time to reach consensus is negligible. The generality and limits of this assumption
is presented later in the discussion section.
42
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF HIERARCHY ON COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
Each time step is defined by one discussion event during which one individual,
i.e. the speaker, talks to multiple individuals, i.e. listeners. The probability P of an
individual i to be chosen as a speaker s is an increasing function of its α value as follows:




The exponent k defines how much the difference in influence is translated into a
difference in the probability to talk. In the simulations we chose k = 4 so that in a group
of 1000 individuals with the most extreme hierarchy, the probability that a leader is
chosen as a speaker is very high (close to 90%). Indeed, we want to explore the whole
scope of social organisation which ranges from everybody having the same probability
to speak to one individual with an extremely high probability to speak. The speaker
talks with Nl listeners randomly sampled from the other individuals in the group. This
limit on the number of listeners models time constraints, and cognitive constraints of
human brains (Dunbar, 1992).
We assume that every individual can be chosen as a listener, i.e. the social network
is a complete network, in order to avoid explicitly modelling the network structure, and
hence to keep the model tractable. This assumption is conservative because a more
limited social network structure should only restrain more the interactions and thus
should increase the consensus time. We also consider that individuals interactions are
not limited to individuals with close opinions (as in models with bounded confidence
Deffuant et al. 2000) because this model describes a consensus decision-making process
where individuals are willing to convince each other. During a discussion event, a
listener v updates its preference to a value x ′v following the equation below, where v
represents the listener and u the speaker:
(3.2) x ′v = xv + (αu −αv)(xu −xv).
We assume that the position of speaker gives a slight influential advantage over the
listeners. Therefore, the minimum difference of influence αu −αv is set to a positive
low value, here 0.01. This assumption is necessary to avoid a systematic convergence of
the opinions towards the individual with the highest α, a phenomenon not observed
in real life. The individuals repeat the previous step until consensus is reached, i.e. the
standard deviation of the opinions is less than a threshold xθ. The number of discussion
events that occurred to reach consensus is called the consensus time, t∗. We considered
only global consensus, i.e. all the group agree. However, the global consensus is more or
less tolerant to deviant opinions as a function of the consensus threshold xθ.
3.5 Results
Opinion formation models are commonly studied using analytical methods in which
is calculated an exact solution. However, these approaches are difficult in presence of
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heterogeneity in the population as it is the case here with individuals having different
values of influence. Thus, we implement the model as an individual-centred model
and use numerical simulations to analyse it. We focus on the effect of the following
parameters: (i) the level of hierarchy represented by the number of leaders and the
difference of influence α between leader and follower profiles (in short difference of
influence) and (ii) the size of the group. The influence of leaders αL and the influence of
follower αL are set symmetrically around 0.5. For instance, a difference of influence of
0.5 means thatαL = 0.5+0.5/2 = 0.75 andαF = 0.5−0.5/2 = 0.25. The default parameters
are for the consensus threshold xθ = 0.05, the number of listeners Nl = 30, group size
N = 500, the influence of leaders αl = 0.75 and the influence of followers αf = 0.25.
The results presented are the mean across 100 replicates for each set of parameters
presented. The error bars or ribbon, when not described in the caption, represent the
standard error from the mean. The error bars might not be visible when they are too
small.
3.5.1 Hierarchy and consensus time
Figure 3.1 shows the main result: the presence of a minority of influential individuals
and a majority of influenceable individuals reduces the time a group spend to reach
consensus. This result is consistent across different values of influence α for leader and
follower profiles. This result shows that a skewed distribution of influence is sufficient
to explain the benefit of hierarchy on collective decision-making. Importantly, the
differential quality of information that leaders might posses, and which might lead to a
group with hierarchy making better decisions, is not required to get this result. When
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Figure 3.1: Consensus time as a function of numbers of leaders and the difference in influence
between leader and follower profiles. The consensus time for single-leader hierarchy is shown
in red. The results presented are the average across 100 replicates.
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Figure 3.2: Standard deviation of the consensus time as a function of numbers of leaders and
the difference in influence between leader and follower profiles. The standard deviation of
the consensus time for a single-leader hierarchy is shown in red. The results presented are the
average across 100 replicates.
influential leaders are present. For high difference in influence, hierarchy with single
leader has the shortest consensus time. In other words, increasing the difference of
influence leads to a slower consensus time for multiple leaders hierarchy but a shorter
consensus time for single-leader hierarchy. Across different values of influence for
leader and follower profiles, the shortest consensus time is obtained in presence of one
single extremely influential leader and the rest of the group as influenceable followers.
Figure 3.2 provides a better insight in the effect of number of leaders on the con-
sensus time. The result shows that when the consensus time for multiple leaders is high,
e.g. high difference of influence, the standard deviation in the consensus time is also
high. This shows that the consensus time is highly variable between replicates. This is
because the consensus time in presence of multiple leaders is highly dependant of the
opinions of these leaders, i.e. fast when opinions are close, and slow when opinions are
more divergent. Groups with multiple leaders with high influence and different opinion
are slow to reach consensus because multiple leaders (i) are slower to be convinced,
(ii) can increase divergence by convincing followers towards extreme opinions and (iii)
can convince followers from other leaders. On the other hand, Figure 3.2 shows that
egalitarian group, i.e. homogeneous group, has a long consensus time but low variation
in the consensus time. This result suggests that the long consensus time in egalitarian
group is due to a slow convergence rather than conflict between leaders. Similarly,
single-leader hierarchy always has a small standard deviation in the consensus time. It
suggests that groups with a single leader with low influence spend more time to reach
consensus simply because leader is less efficient at bringing the opinions of others
toward its own. The fact that the leader is stubborn has no effect because he is the one
convincing the rest of the group.
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Number of discussion events
Figure 3.3: Density distribution of individual opinion as a function of number of discussion
events for different number of leaders: from top to bottom 0,1,2,10. On the left, the difference
of influence is small 0.3. On the right, the difference of influence is high 0.7. The background
is set to black and it represents the absence of any individual with this value of opinion. For
illustration, the difference between the initial opinions of leaders are set to be maximum and
equidistant. The plot represents results for a single run.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the opinion formation process and the effect of the number
of leaders on collective decision-making. When the difference of influence between
leaders and followers is low (on the left), the pattern of convergence is not much affected
by the number of leaders. This is because leaders and followers have close influence
and thus, do not create strong variations. Multiple leaders are more efficient because
leaders convinced each other and once their opinions are close, they quickly convince
the rest of the group. When the difference of influence between leaders and followers is
high (on the right), the pattern of convergence is much more affected by the number of
leaders. First, we see that in the absence of leaders, or with a single leader, individuals’
opinions slowly and consistently converge. The presence of a single leader speeds up
this process as the leader quickly convinces the majority of the group. The presence of
multiple leaders creates a more heterogeneous pattern of convergence. The presence of
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Figure 3.4: Consensus time as a function of numbers of leaders and different value of consensus
threshold xθ. The consensus time for single-leader hierarchy is shown in red. The results
presented are the average across 100 replicates.
two leaders results into two cluster of opinions with the majority of followers switching
from one leader to another: leaders alternatively convince individuals from the group
but neither leader has enough followers to reach consensus. When more than two
leaders are present, the majority of opinion fluctuates between the different leaders.
In both cases, leaders’ stubbornness slows down the convergence of leaders’ opinions
towards the others, which in turn slows down collective decision-making.
To summarise, hierarchy, i.e. a majority of influential individuals and a minority
of influenceable individuals reduces the consensus time. When the difference in the
influence between leaders and followers is low, multiple leaders has the shortest con-
sensus time. When the difference in the influence between leaders and followers is high,
single-leader hierarchy provides a benefit to group organisation because it has a shorter
consensus time and a more constant consensus time. Overall, the shortest consensus
time is reached for a hierarchy with a single influential leader.
We consider here that only global consensus is possible, i.e. the whole group agrees
on the decision. We make this choice because we consider that all individuals need to
participate to the task. We can vary the consensus threshold xθ to allow for a more or
less strict consensus, i.e. divergent opinions are more or less accepted.
Figure 3.4 shows that the main result is consistent across different value of con-
sensus threshold xθ: a minority of influential individual and a majority of influenceable
individuals leads to shorter consensus time. On the one hand, the consensus time for
single-leader hierarchy is only slightly affected by the consensus threshold. This is be-
cause in a single-leader hierarchy, the leader convinces each listener in one discussion
and thus, the consensus time is simply the time for the leader to talk to all individuals.
On the other hand, the consensus threshold strongly affects the consensus time for
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Figure 3.5: Consensus time as a function of the size of the group for three different types of
social organisation: (i) 0 leaders, (ii) 1 leader and (iii) 10 leaders. The ribbons represents the
standard deviation to highlight the high variance in the consensus time when multiple leaders
are present. The results presented are the average across 100 replicates.
egalitarian and multiple leaders hierarchy. In the case of egalitarian, a higher consensus
threshold reduces the consensus time because individuals can have more different
opinions at consensus and thus, need to be convinced less. In the case of multiple
leaders hierarchy, a higher consensus threshold reduces the consensus time because
the group can ignore the diverging opinions of few stubborn leaders.
3.5.2 Hierarchy and scalar stress
The cost of consensus decision-making is considered particularly important in large
groups and functional theories propose that the main role of leaders and hierarchy is
to limit the increase of this cost with group size i.e. limits scalar stress (Johnson, 1982;
Powers and Lehmann, 2014). Thus, we now investigate the effects of group size on the
time to reach consensus and how hierarchy as we defined it, affects this relationship.
The group sizes considered for the replicated simulations are from 50 to 1000 with an
increment of 50. The number of leaders considered is only between [0,50] because they
are the instances where a consensus time for each possible group size can be measured.
For instance, there is only one case of a group with 1000 leaders.
Figure 3.5 presents the increase in consensus time for three different social organ-
isations, an egalitarian group (no leaders), hierarchy with one leader, and hierarchy
with ten leaders. Figure 3.5 shows that hierarchy reduces scalar stress, i.e. the gradient
of consensus time with respect to group size is lower. Again, the differential quality of
information that leaders might posses, and which might lead to a group with hierarchy
making better decisions, is not required to get this result. The results also show that the
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Figure 3.6: Scalar stress (represented by linear regression coefficient) as a function of numbers
of leaders and the difference in influence between leader and follower profiles. The linear
regression coefficient for single-leader hierarchy is shown in red. The results presented are the
average across 100 replicates.
presence of multiple leaders reduces the benefit of hierarchy and increases the variance
in the consensus time.
To provide a more thorough investigation of the effect of size on consensus time,
we present the regression coefficient of the linear regression of consensus time on size.
Note that the relation between consensus time and size is not perfectly linear for a
small number of leaders and thus, the coefficient estimated is slightly off. However, the
relation is close to linear and we are interested in clear differences rather than small
quantitative differences. Figure 3.6 shows that scalar stress has similar behaviour than
the consensus time. First, hierarchy has a lower scalar stress for any difference between
the influence of leaders and followers. Second, multiple hierarchy has the lowest scalar
stress when the difference is low and single-leader hierarchy has the lowest scalar stress
when the difference is high. Third, the lowest scalar stress appears for groups with a
single leader with high influence.
Figure 3.7 shows that the scalar stress is strongly dependant of the number of
listeners Nl. It demonstrates that a lower number of listeners results in an increase in
consensus time, in particular for egalitarian group and multiple leaders hierarchy. This
is because a low number of listeners (i) slows down the overall convergence and (ii)
slows down the convergence between groups of stubborn leaders and their convinced
followers. For a high number of listeners NL, the consensus time for multiple leaders
hierarchy is close to the consensus time for single-leader hierarchy.
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Figure 3.7: Scalar stress (represented by linear regression coefficient) as a function of numbers
of leaders and number of listeners Nl.The linear regression coefficient for single-leader hierarchy
is shown in red. The results presented are the average across 100 replicates.
3.6 Discussion
Ethnographic data suggest that leaders provide an important benefit to the group by
reducing the cost of consensus decision-making (Carneiro, 1967). In particular, this
benefit would be amplified in large groups i.e. leaders would reduce scalar stress
(Johnson, 1982; Alberti, 2014). We investigate these effects in an opinion formation
model which integrates heterogeneity in individuals’ capacity to influence. We use
numerical simulations to investigate the qualitative effect of number of leaders and
group size on the consensus time. First, our results show that the presence of influential
leaders and influenceable followers reduces the consensus time. Second, the presence
of influential leaders and influenceable followers reduces scalar stress, i.e. the gradient
of consensus time with respect to group size is lower. Importantly, both of these benefit
emerge solely from the difference of influence between leaders and follower. Third, the
highest and most constant benefit is obtained for a hierarchy with a single leader with
extreme influence.
These results confirm the hypothesis that social hierarchy provides a benefit to
group organisation and that this benefit increases as group grows (Calvert, 1992). Our
results complete this hypothesis by showing that the difference in individual capacity
to influence is sufficient to explain the organisational benefit of social hierarchy. In
addition, the work presented here provides a mechanistic model of the role of hierarchy
in collective decision-making that can be applied across a wide range of domains.
This work expands on previous research in social dynamics. A previous opinion
formation model shows that the benefit of hierarchy on organisation can emerge from
micro-level interactions between individuals (Gavrilets et al., 2016). Their results fo-
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cused more on the effect of diversity and only suggest that leader being persuasive,
stubborn and talkative can provide a strong reduction to the consensus time. Our
findings confirm this result and provide a more thorough exploration. In addition, it
broadens their conclusion by showing that this effect is dependant of the number of
leaders and the difference of influence between leaders and followers. In particular, we
show that multiple leaders can have a limited benefit, because leaders persuade each
others’ followers, creating conflicts of interest between a large proportion of the group.
Unlike their work, our model considers the three traits stubbornness, persuasiveness
and talkativeness as one. Combining their work and ours, further work could disam-
biguate the effects of these three characteristics on the consensus time and provide a
better understanding of how does hierarchy facilitate collective decision-making.
This prior work also shows that an increase in the group size slows down the con-
sensus, because it creates more stubborn individuals (Gavrilets et al., 2016). Yet this
effect was limited. Our results add that group size can have a very significant effect on
the consensus time, and that this effect can be tempered by the presence of influential
leaders. Previous work (Gavrilets et al., 2016) does not find a strong effect of group size
on the consensus time because they consider that multiple discussion events happen
during one time step and thus, the consensus time is divided by the number of discus-
sion events per time step. However, such an assumption considers that individuals are
able to group themselves in an exact and non-overlapping number of groups, e.g. 100
individuals getting split in 10 subgroups of 10 individuals. This process is unlikely in
the absence of advanced institutions or rules stating how the division needs to be done.
However, it fits well with more advanced forms of hierarchy such as states.
We considered here that the initial opinions widely differ between individuals. If
the opinions were initially similar, the consensus would be reached quickly and leaders
would provide a negligible benefit. So to which scenario this assumption of divergent
opinions would apply? And a fortiori, in which collective tasks leaders could be expected
to provide a significant benefit? First, this assumption would hold for tasks in which
the interests of individuals do not align. This encompasses a large range of scenario
as collective tasks often carry different benefits and costs for individuals. For instance,
even if all individuals want to hunt, some would prefer to hunt at a different time, or
have a different role, or get a higher share of the game. Yet, the benefit provided by
leaders could vary as a function of the magnitude of the conflict of interests. This
relationship could be explored by extending the presented analysis and considering
different initial distributions of opinions. Second, the assumption of different initial
opinions holds for coordination problems that are novels or changing enough for
cultural selection to not solve the coordination problem. If the task is sufficiently
repeated and its features remain sufficiently constant, cultural selection would favour
the optimal decision and the opinions of individuals would converge toward a similar
strategy (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). A good example of this scenario is the design of
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institutional rules (Ostrom, 1990) because the efficiency of institutional rules depends of
the social environment and social environment often changes more rapidly than abiotic
environment. For instance, the efficiency of a rule to enforce cooperation depends of
the proportion of defectors, which itself depends of the efficiency of the rule (Dong
et al., 2019). The relationship between the nature of the task and the benefit provided by
leaders could be explored in the future by considering explicitly a task and integrating
the cultural evolution of opinions.
We considered here a complete network and only global consensus, i.e. all the group
agree. Despite both being conservative assumptions, they are two unlikely features of
real world situations. Jalili (2013) developed an opinion formation considering local
consensus where he looks at the effect of the distribution of persuasion (called social
power) within different network structures. This model shows that when persuasion
is asymmetrically distributed with the most connected individuals having the highest
social power, the consensus is largely improved with the largest cluster at the end of
consensus moving from 30 to 85 % of the total. Yet, this result does not hold on other
network structures in which there is not large differences in the number of social links.
Further work could integrate network structure to investigate the effect of hierarchy
and group size as defined here on the consensus time. However, this requires a good
representation of the social structure of individuals during consensus decision-making,
which can be more dynamic than the social network observed in long-term interactions.
We have used numerical simulations to investigate the effect of leaders on consensus
decision-making. An important next step is to investigate this question analytically and
in particular, to get a mathematical description of the relationship between skewness of
the distribution of influence and consensus time. Along this line, it is important to note
the parallel between opinion formation models and population genetics models (Crow
and Kimura, 1970). Indeed, the process of consensus-decision making as modelled here
is similar to the fixation of alleles in a population only subject to random drift. It has
been shown in population genetics that a high variance in reproductive success results
in a stronger random drift and a faster fixation of allele (Wright, 1938). This result is
close to our result of consensus being faster to obtained when individuals vary in their
capacity to transmit their opinions. Pushing further, such analytical model would allow,
by their simplicity, to explore more complex consensus decision-making process. For
instance, if we consider that better ideas are more propagated, population genetics
suggests that heterogeneity could be detrimental because it reduces the change that
this opinion is chosen (more exactly, population genetics shows that heterogeneity in
reproductive success increases the effect of random drift compared to selection). Yet,
this parallel between the presented model and population genetics needs to be carefully
examined to know how much results from population genetics could directly apply to
the present case. Nonetheless, it is one of the most promising path to build an analytical
version of this model and should be explored in further work.
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Our results show one possible explanation for the benefit that leaders provide to
group organisation but multiple mechanisms are likely to be involved. In particular,
although Neolithic leaders might not have a more advanced knowledge or expertise than
other members of the group (because they take decisions on a wide range of topics),
they might be able to take better decisions by aggregating knowledge from different
individuals. Yet, it is worth noting that such mechanism will be more important in
multi-level hierarchy where lower-level leaders could report to higher-level leaders.
Further work exploring this role of leader in decision-making could provide important
insights on the evolution of bureaucratic states.
We have shown that differential influence is enough to explain the benefit of hier-
archy. It has been hypothesised that this benefit could lead to the evolution of influential
leaders and influenceable followers. Yet, there is a conflict between this group benefit
and the individual cost of being a follower. In the next chapter, we investigate if this
organisational benefit coupled to the demographic increase of the Neolithic transition
can drive the evolution of leader and follower behaviours.
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[ Fourth Chapter \
The evolution of informal hierarchy
In Chapter 3, we have shown that the presence of a minority of influential and a majority
of influenceable individuals facilitate group organisation because (i) it reduces the time
a group spent to reach consensus and (ii) it reduces scalar stress, i.e. the gradient of
time to consensus with respect to group size is lower. In this chapter, we investigate if
this organisational benefit can lead to the evolution of leaders and followers behaviours
and in such proportion, i.e. the evolution of informal hierarchy.
4.1 Contribution
We demonstrate in this chapter that the organisational benefit of hierarchy can drive the
evolution of leader and follower behaviours and ultimately, the transition from small
egalitarian to large hierarchical groups. We show that informal hierarchy can evolve de
novo in the presence of low initial inequality and increasing returns to scale, which are
two reasonable assumptions for small-scale societies as observed before the Neolithic
transition. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first formal demonstration that volun-
tary theories of hierarchy can explain the emergence of large-scale informal hierarchy,
defined by individuals’ behaviour rather than by established political institutions.
4.2 Publications
The majority of the work in this chapter has been published as:
• Cedric Perret, Simon T.Powers and Emma Hart, Emergence of hierarchy from
the evolution of individual influence in an agent-based model, Proceedings of
Artificial Life Conference 2017, MIT Press, 2017
In addition, a portion of the work presented in this chapter has been submitted as:
• Cedric Perret, Emma Hart and Simon T.Powers, From disorganised equality to
efficient hierarchy: How does group size drive the evolution of hierarchy in human
societies, Proceedings of Royal Society B: Biological sciences. Submitted in 2020.
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4.3 Introduction
From companies to political parties, organisations tend to follow an “iron law of olig-
archy”, in which larger and more productive groups switch to hierarchy where a few
individuals possess most of the political power, resources and influence (Michels, 1911).
Despite this transition being well known, it is still hard to explain why human groups
follow this general trend. As seen in Chapter 2, the absence of coercive means and
the long period of egalitarianism (Boehm, 2001) preceding the transition to hierarchy
suggests that this transition was voluntary. Functional theories propose that hierarchy
provided an important benefit to the group, thus explaining its emergence. Previous
work have shown the evolution of leaders as monitors (Hooper et al., 2010) or contribut-
ors (Gavrilets and Fortunato, 2014) but there is limited work exploring the role of leader
as an organiser. Yet, this role of organiser is particularly interesting because it also gives
gives a mean for leaders to bias collective decisions and monopolise resources.
We have shown in Chapter 3 that leaders facilitate group organisation by reducing
the time a group spend to reach a consensus. But showing this benefit is not enough to
explain the emergence of hierarchy because leaders often enjoy a preferential access
to resources (Flannery and Marcus, 2012; Hayden, 2001) and mating partners (Zeitzen,
2008; Summers, 2005). Functional explanations for the emergence of hierarchy suggest
that the group benefit brought by hierarchy would be enough to overcome individual
selection driving everyone to become a leader rather than a follower (Spisak et al.,
2015; Powers and Lehmann, 2014). Yet, there is a conflict between individual and group
interests, which makes this condition not trivial (Frank, 1998). A key element to solve this
puzzle is the scalar stress, which describes the fact that the cost of organisation scales
up with group size (Johnson, 1982). The increase in group size kicked off by agriculture
and sustained by subsequent technological innovations, could have amplified the
organisational benefit of hierarchy. This relation between size and social organisation
appears in the strong correlation between group size and the socio-cultural complexity
of societies, e.g. the number of political units, (Johnson, 1982; Carneiro, 1967), number
of organisational traits (Carneiro, 1967) or probability of group fission (Alberti, 2014).
On one side of the range, small whale hunters have one single coach to coordinate
group hunting (Friesen, 1999). On the other extreme, complex states or companies have
dozens of politicians and managers who are fully dedicated to the task of organising.
Recent work has shown that scalar stress can drive the evolution of institutional
hierarchy, i.e. with an appointed leader, because of a feedback loop between the forma-
tion of hierarchy which increases production and subsequently group size, and group
size which increases the need for hierarchy (Powers and Lehmann, 2014). Yet, the lack
of a mechanistic model describing the effect of hierarchy on group decision-making
has limited further investigation of scalar stress and its role in the evolution of hierarchy.
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In particular, human groups also exhibit informal hierarchy where leaders and follow-
ers are defined by their intrinsic characteristics, either physical e.g. height (Berggren
et al., 2010), or psychological e.g. talkativeness, charisma (Judge et al., 2002). Unlike
the institutional hierarchy assumed in previous work (Powers and Lehmann, 2014),
informal hierarchy does not require political institutions and thus is a strong candidate
to explain the first emergence of hierarchy. On the other side, informal hierarchy poses
an important challenge as it lacks of a dedicated institution which can enforce hierarchy,
and in particular counteract the pressure pushing everyone to become a leader.
This unexplored gap comes from the fact that models of group decision-making and
models of evolution require a compatible description of hierarchy. In the Chapter 3,
we have described leader and followers by their influence and we have shown how a
skewed distribution of influence can lead to a faster consensus. We now incorporate this
previous model into an evolutionary model simulating the evolution of influence. The
population is structured in patches and within a patch, individuals organise together
to produce a collective good. The time to reach consensus determines the cost of
organisation, and the influence of an individual on the final decision determines that
individual’s share of the collective good. The group size varies as a function of the
resources of the group and groups compete indirectly by differential migration. Using
this model, we aim to answer the following question
Research question. Can the organisational advantage of a skewed distribution of influ-
ence drive the evolution of individuals toward leader and followers behaviours even if it
creates inequality?
4.4 Model definition
4.4.1 Model outline and life cycle
As a reminder, individuals were previously defined by their opinion x and their influence
α. The trait α carried by individuals is now an evolving trait. The influence of an
individual can now take any value between [0,1] rather than the value of one of the two
profiles defined in Chapter 3. We make the choice of a continuous trait so we do not
constraint the possible distribution of influence evolving. Although a division into two
profiles, leader and follower, is commonly seen in real world, it has to emerge in this
model. The values of the trait α are initially sampled from the uniform distribution
between [0,1]. The trait α is transmitted vertically from parent to offspring, e.g. by social
learning, as is common in hunter-gatherer groups (Hewlett et al., 2011) and modern
societies (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1982). The trait α mutates following a mutation rate of µ.
As α is assumed to be at least partly cultural, we assume a mutation rate higher than
for a classical genetic trait. When a mutation occurs, a random value is sampled from a
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truncated Gaussian distribution centred on the current value of the trait, with variance
σm. The opinion x describes a generic opinion of an individual on how to realise a
collective task e.g. next raid target, plan of an irrigation system or value of a law. The
values of opinion x are sampled from the uniform distribution between [0,1] at each
generation. That is because we assume that the tasks tackled by the groups are different
at each generation, and so opinions are not heritable. We describe social organisation
as a distribution of influence and use opinion formation to link this distribution back
to the cost of organisation as in Chapter 3. Egalitarian to highly hierarchical groups
are represented by an equal to strongly skewed distribution of influence α. We study
the evolution of α using a classic island model with a population of individuals that is
subdivided into a finite number of patches, Np (Wright, 1931). The life cycle consists
of discrete and non-overlapping generations, where in each generation the following
occur: 1. collective decision-making about how to perform a task; 2. performance of
the collective task; 3. distribution of resources obtained from the task; 4. reproduction;
5. migration. The first three steps determinate the success of an individual, which
we denote by its fitness w . In short, the fitness of an individual depends on its share
of the additional resources produced by the collective task, discounted by the cost of
organisation. The cost of organisation and the share of individuals result from the
collective decision-making 4.3 and 4.5.
4.4.2 Reproduction
The fitness of an individual is translated into a number of offspring, which is drawn
from a Poisson distribution centered on the fitness w . After reproduction, offspring
individuals migrate with a probability equal to a fixed migration rate m. Migrating
individuals enter a patch chosen at random from the population (excluding their natal
patch). More formally, the fitness w of individual i on patch j at time t is described by
the following equation:
(4.1) wi j (t ) = ra
1+ N j (t )K
+ rbi j (t ).
where N j (t) is the total number of individual on patch j . The fitness of an individual
is the sum of (i) an intrinsic growth rate ra limited by the carrying capacity K , and (ii)
an additional growth rate resulting from the extra resources produced by the collective
task, rbi j (t). The additional growth rate rbi j (t) is not limited by the carrying capacity,
but the competition between individuals is taken into account during the distribution
of collective resources. It is calculated as follows:
(4.2) rbi j (t ) =βr(1−e−γr(B j (t )pi j (t ))).
The term rbi j (t ) is calculated from a logistic function described byγr andβr, respectively
the steepness and the maximum of the increase in growth rate induced by the additional
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resources. The additional resources are given by the total amount of benefit, B j (t),
multiplied by the share the individual receives, pi j (t ). The increase of the growth rate
follows a logistic relation because of the inevitable presence of other limiting factors.
4.4.3 Collective decision-making and collective task
To produce the additional resources B j (t ), individuals first undergo a collective decision-
making process on their patch, as defined in the Chapter 3. As a reminder, the collective
decision-making is simulated by an opinion formation model, which describes a se-
quence of discussions between individuals until consensus is reached. After consensus
is reached, all individuals on a patch take part in the collective task which produces an
amount of extra resource B j (t ):
(4.3) B j (t ) = B j (t −1)S + βb
1+e−γb(N j (t )−bmid) −Co ∗ .
The benefit is calculated from a sigmoid function described by βb, bmid and γb, respec-
tively the maximum, the group size at the sigmoid’s midpoint, and the steepness of
the increase in the benefit induced by additional participants. We make the assump-
tion of increasing returns to scale in which additional participants increase the benefit
superlinearly (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). But as is standard in microeconomic
theory, we also make the conservative assumption that the benefit of the collective task
eventually has diminishing marginal returns which overcomes the increasing returns to
scale because of other limiting factors (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). To capture the
transmissibility of resources (Mattison et al., 2016), we assume that a surplus S of the
benefit is passed to the next generation. The extra resources are discounted by the cost
of organisation Co
(4.4) Coj(t ) = t∗j Ct
The cost of organisation comes from the time dedicated to organisation t∗ instead
of carrying out the actual task, i.e. it is an opportunity cost. This cost is modulated
by a parameter Ct, which describes the time constraints on group decision-making.
The parameter Ct depends on the pressure of time on the task, for instance, the speed
of depletion of resources or the need to build defences before an enemy arrives. To
avoid studying the effect of social strategy in the collective task, which has already been
extensively studied in the evolution of cooperation literature (West et al., 2007), we
consider that all the individuals on a patch are willing to participate in the collective
task once a decision is reached. The collective task simulates the numerous cooperative
tasks realised during the lifetime of an individual. It can encompass many actions such
as warfare battle or construction of an irrigation system.
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4.4.4 Distribution of common resources
The resources obtained from the collective task are distributed among all individuals
on the patch. We want to test if hierarchy can emerge even if leaders receive a higher
share of the collective resources, which selects against individuals becoming followers.
However, leaders are not clearly designated in informal hierarchy. We assume that in
the absence of coercive means, individuals can only increase their share by biasing the
collective decisions towards their own interests and thus, the share of an individual
pi j (t ) is a function of its realised influence αr such that:
(4.5) pi j (t ) =
1+dαr (i j ) (t )∑N j
i=1(1+dαr (i j )(t ))
.
The asymmetry of the distribution of the resources is modulated by a parameter d ,
which represents the level of ecological inequality. For d = 0, a patch is totally egalitarian
and the influence of an individual does not affect the share of that individual. Such a
scenario is close to the society of pre-Neolithic hunter-gatherers (Boehm, 2001). It is
assumed for simplicity that d is the same for all patches, and is determined for example
by the state of technology, such as food storage and military technologies. Nevertheless,
different patches can have more or less despotic distributions of resources due to
different distributions of αr values. The realised influence of an individual αr (i j ) is
calculated from the difference between an individual’s initial opinion and the final
decision and measures how much the final decision is close to the individual’s interest:
(4.6) αr (i j ) = 1−|xi j (t = 0)−x∗j |
4.5 Results
We use this model to answer the following question:
Research question. Can the organisational advantage of a skewed distribution of influ-
ence drive the evolution of individuals toward leader and followers behaviours even if it
creates inequality?
The model defines a stochastic process for the evolving trait, and for the repro-
duction and decision-making processes. Because of the nonlinearities of the model,
which result from the interactions of all of the variables, we analyse it using replicated
numerical simulations.
We define hierarchy as a positively skewed distribution of influence α, which de-
scribes a minority of individual with high influence α and a majority of individuals with
low influence α. We use skewness rather than fitting and estimating the parameters
of a particular distribution e.g. bimodal distribution, for two reasons. First, skewness
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is more general in the sense that it does not make assumption on the distribution
observed. Second, skewness is easier to calculate because it does not need to measure
how much the distribution fits the data and to estimate the parameters of a distribution.
The skewness is measured by the Pearson’s moment coefficient of skewness µ3α(t ):
(4.7) µ3α(t ) = E [(α(t )− ᾱ(t )
σα(t )
)3]
with ᾱ(t) the mean of α at time t and σα(t) the standard deviation of α at time t . We
focus on the effect of the following parameters: (i) the level of ecological inequality d
because it is the main limit to informal hierarchy and (ii) and the number of listeners
nl, which affects the intensity of scalar stress (as seen in Chapter 3). We also explore
the effect of (i) the time constraints on group decision-making Ct because it affects
the benefit provided by hierarchy, (ii) the migration rate m, which affects the popula-
tion structure and (iii) the absence of transmission of resources from one generation
to another (S = 0). The default values for the parameters studied, unless otherwise
specified, are for the level of inequality d = 1, the number of listeners nl = 30, the time
constraints on group decision-making Ct = 2, the migration rate m = 0.05 and the frac-
tion of resources transmit to next generation S = 0.9. The results presented are the
average across patches when the result is a function of generations. and the average
across patches, generations and simulations when the result is a function of a para-
meter. The error-bars represent the standard error from the mean across replicates. The
default parameter values used in the simulations, unless otherwise specified, are for the
number of patches Np = 50, the initial number of individuals on each patch N j (0) = 50,
the carrying capacity K = 50, the intrinsic growth rate ra = 2, the increase of benefit as a
function of size (maximum, steepness, mid-point) βb = 10000, γb = 0.005, bmid = 500.
These values are chosen in order to allow the transition between tribe size (50 to 100
individuals) to small chiefdom size (500 individuals) (Earle, 1987). The default values
for the increase in growth rate due to additional resources (maximum and steepness)
are βr = 3, γr = 0.025. They are chosen so that additional resources lead to a clearly
increased fitness. The remaining default parameters are for the consensus threshold
xθ = 0.05, the mutation rate µm = 0.01, the mutation strength σm = 0.01.
Figure 4.1 presents the evolution of the distribution of influence and group size as a
function of generations for a single run. The results show that despite the wide range
of possible distribution of influence, the population evolves towards hierarchy, i.e. a
minority of leaders with high influence and a majority of followers with low influence.
In the meantime, the population grows to a large group size. Within a patch, informal
hierarchy also evolves but the proportion of leaders and followers vary. The result is
stable across replicates and in the long term as shown by Figure 4.2.A . At the start of
the simulation, groups have a skewness close to 0 and a small group size because the
values of influence are randomly initiated. Figure 4.2.A demonstrates that skewness
increases with time and remains at a positive value along generations. The positive
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the distribution of influence α, and evolution of group size as a function
of generations for the whole population (top) and three different patches (bottom). The plot
represents results for a single run.
skewness reflects a majority of individuals with low influence - followers - and a minority
of individuals with high influence - leaders. This result is also present in absence of
intergenerational transmission of resources (S = 0) as seen in Figure 4.3. Overall, this
result shows that hierarchy can emerge from the evolution of individual behaviour and
thus, informal hierarchy provides a clear evolutionary advantage.
The benefit of an efficient hierarchical organisation appears in Figure 4.2.C . It shows
that over generations, the consensus time and the total amount of resources both in-
crease. This is because group size increases and leads to more resources being produced
due to increasing returns to scale. It also results in a greater difficulty to organise. How-
ever, it can be observed in Figure 4.2.C that the increase in consensus time stabilises
before the end of the increase in extra resources. This is because individuals have adop-
ted an informal hierarchy and can maintain a low cost of organisation as the group size
and the production of resources continue to increase. The benefit of hierarchy depends
of the time constraints Ct which translates the consensus time into an opportunity cost
of organisation. Figure 4.4 shows that the level of hierarchy is proportional to the time
constraints. For a low level of time constraints, the benefit of hierarchy has a negligible
effect on organisation and group production and thus, hierarchy does not evolve. For
tasks with strong time constraints, e.g. warfare, the benefit of hierarchy is amplified and
a strong hierarchy, i.e. high skewness of the distribution of influence, evolves.
61



























































Figure 4.2: Evolution of (A) the average skewness of distribution of influence α, (B) average
group size, (C) average time to reach consensus (red) and average amount of resources produced
(blue) as a function of generations. Informal hierarchy is represented by a positive skewness.
The values presented are the average across patches, 5000 generations and 32 replicates. The
simulations are run for 10000 generations and the first 5000 generations are ignored to limit the
effects of initial conditions.
Hierarchy evolves because it reduces the cost of organisation and thus provides the
creation of surplus in group production. These surplus resources are distributed among
the individuals and increase the number of offspring individuals produce. It results in
hierarchical groups being larger and exporting a larger number of migrants than groups
without hierarchy. Most of these migrants are followers because most of the population
within a hierarchy are followers. Ultimately, it spreads hierarchical organisation to other
groups and at the level of population, it creates a stable distribution of individuals with
low and high influence.
Importantly, this process occurs even when the emergence of hierarchy creates
inequality. Inequality limits the development of hierarchy because it increases the
number of offspring leaders produce and potentially drives all individuals within a
group to develop high influence. This is because leaders will more often bring the group
decision close to their preferences and thus receive a higher share of the resources
produced. This effect can be seen in Figure 4.5.A, which shows that a higher level of
inequality reduces the skewness of the distribution of influence. This effect is limited by
the competition between leaders. In the presence of multiple leaders, a leader can get a
lower share of the resource than followers if the group becomes convinced by another
leader during the decision-making process. In this case, the“losing” leaders are further
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the average skewness of distribution of influence α and the average
group size as a function of generations in the absence of intergenerational transmission of
resources (S = 0). Reducing the transmission of resources also decreases the total amount of
resources available. To distinguish the effect of the transmission of resources from a decrease of
resources produced, we maintain the amount of resources produced to be the same value than
simulations with S = 0.9, by multiplying the total amount of resources produced B j (t) by 1.9.
The values presented are the average across patches, 5000 generations and 32 replicates. The
simulations are run for 10000 generations and the first 5000 generations are ignored to limit the
effects of initial conditions.
from the final decision because they are harder to convince. However, the fact that
hierarchy does not evolve for high levels of inequality shows that this competition is not
always enough to stop the increase in number of leaders and the collapse of hierarchy.
The second reason explaining the evolution of hierarchy despite inequality is that even
if leaders receive more resources, followers still get a higher amount of resources and
offspring than they would in a group without hierarchy. Large groups produce more
resources due to increasing returns to scale, e.g. division of labour and specialisation.
We have seen previously that hierarchy reduces the time to reach consensus but it
also provides a second main advantage to group organisation: it reduces scalar stress. To
test the importance of this factor in the evolution of hierarchy, we look at the skewness of
the distribution of influence for different values of number of listeners, Nl. Figure 4.5.B
shows that high scalar stress, i.e. low number of listeners Nl, leads to the evolution of a
more skewed distribution of influence. On the other hand, a low scalar stress, i.e. here
represented by a high number of listeners Nl, leads to the disappearance of hierarchy.
This result shows that the benefit of reducing scalar stress is a crucial factor in the
evolution of hierarchy. This is because scalar stress creates a positive feedback loop by
which hierarchy increases its own benefit. On the one hand, an efficient hierarchical
organisation allows a group to produce a larger amount of resources and hence to reach
a larger size. On the other hand, hierarchy provides a stronger advantage as group size
increases because the cost of organisation increases less in hierarchical groups than in
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Figure 4.4: Average skewness of the distribution of influence α and average group size as
a function of the time constraints on group organisation Ct. The values presented are the
average across patches, 5000 generations and 32 replicates. The simulations are run for 10000
generations and the first 5000 generations are ignored to limit the effects of initial conditions.
acephalous groups. There is a feedback loop between hierarchy leading to larger group
size, and larger group size increasing the benefit of hierarchy. Eventually, this feedback
loop comes to an end due to diminishing marginal returns i.e. other limiting factors
than group size. Yet, this feedback loop amplifies the benefit that hierarchy provides to
the group members and favours its evolution.
To summarise, social organisation is the equilibrium between two opposing forces,
competition within groups where inequality pushes individuals to evolve high influ-
ence, and competition between individuals of different groups where efficient group
organisation pushes most individuals to evolve low influence. To give more insight into
the selection forces in play, we use the kin selection framework and describe the benefit
that the trait provides to the individual carrying the trait (direct benefit) and the benefit
that the trait provides to related individuals (indirect benefit) (Frank, 1998). Hierarchy
provides one direct and one significant indirect benefit to followers compared to in-
dividuals in acephalous groups. First, hierarchy provides a direct benefit to followers
because it increases the amount of surplus resources produced and thus, it increases the
fitness of followers. Second, hierarchy provides an indirect benefit to followers because
it increases the group size and hence the amount of resources produced in the following
generation. This, in turn, increases the fitness of followers’ offspring 1. The contribution
of each benefit is hard to distinguish but their role can be examined by investigating
the effect of high migration rate, which suppresses population structure and hence
any indirect benefit to offspring on the same patch. Figure 4.6 shows that, considering
moderate time constraints, a high migration rate leads to the disappearance of hierarchy
1Note that hierarchy also provides an indirect benefit to followers at the same generation because it
increases the amount of resources received by related individuals. However, this benefit is negligible in
large groups (Frank, 1998).
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Figure 4.5: Average skewness of the distribution of influence α as a function of the level of eco-
logical inequality d and the number of listeners nl. The values presented are the average across
patches, 5000 generations and 32 replicates. The simulations are run for 10000 generations and
the first 5000 generations are ignored to limit the effects of initial conditions.
at equilibrium. This highlights the importance of the indirect benefit to offspring that
remain on the patch in sustaining hierarchy. On the other hand, Figure 4.7 shows that
hierarchy evolves for any migration rate if the the time constraints are high. In this
case, the direct benefit is high enough to overcome the cost of economic inequality. In
conclusion, hierarchy can evolve when time constraints are high through the immediate
direct benefit of producing extra resources, but the indirect benefit resulting from the
feedback loop between hierarchy, group size and scalar stress allows hierarchy to evolve
over a much wider range of conditions.
4.6 Discussion
The origin of leadership in human societies is still hard to comprehend. In particular,
leaders tend to exploit followers, which should theoretically limit the evolution of fol-
lowers. Group size and the resultant scalar stress have been proposed as a crucial factor
to explain the emergence of hierarchy from previously egalitarian groups (Johnson,
1982; Powers and Lehmann, 2014). Yet, the investigation of this hypothesis in models
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Figure 4.6: Average value of Pearson’s moment coefficient of skewness of the distribution
of influence α and average group size across 5000 generations and across 32 replicates as a
function of migration rate m.The time constraints on group organisation is moderate Ct = 2.
The parameter ranges from m = 0 i.e. each group is independent to m = 1− 1Np i.e. a well-mixed
population. The simulations are run for 10000 generations and the first 5000 generations are
ignored to limit the effects of initial conditions. The error bars represent the standard error from












































Figure 4.7: Average value of Pearson’s moment coefficient of skewness of the distribution of
influenceα and average group size across 5000 generations and across 32 replicates as a function
of migration rate m. The time constraints on group organisation is high Ct = 3. The parameter
ranges from m = 0 i.e. each group is independent to m = 1− 1Np i.e. well-mixed population. The
simulations are run for 10000 generations and the first 5000 generations are ignored to limit the
effects of initial conditions. The error bars represent the standard error from the mean between
replicates.
of evolutionary dynamics has been limited so far. To fill this gap, we have described
group social organisation by the distribution of an individual trait, the influence. We
have integrated a mechanistic model of social dynamics within an evolutionary model
to test if influential leader and influenceable follower behaviours can emerge by evol-
utionary processes at the individual level. Our results demonstrate that this benefit
provides enough selective pressure to lead to the emergence of informal hierarchy
from bottom-up evolution of individual behaviours, even if this hierarchy results in
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inequality.
The model developed by Powers and Lehmann (2014)] shows that leadership as
an institution can evolve if hierarchy leads to an increase in group size (Powers and
Lehmann, 2014). Our model has independently confirmed that this prediction holds
even when leadership emerges bottom-up from the evolution of traits affecting indi-
vidual influence. To understand whether leadership could have emerged first from
bottom-up individual behaviour and then later become institutionalised, or whether
the opposite is true, is still an important question to fully understand the evolution
of leadership. This model shows that the former is a plausible scenario and suggests
further investigation of the interactions between bottom-up and top-down creation of
leadership roles in societies. More broadly, our model is in line with theoretical works
that propose a voluntary emergence of hierarchy and joins previous works that focused
on a particular task, e.g. building irrigation systems (Wittfogel, 1957) or maintaining
cooperation by policing (Hooper et al., 2015).
Our findings predict that the level of hierarchy, i.e. skewness of the distribution of
influence, should increase with group size and with the cost of organisation of the tasks
tackled by the group. A previous review of ethnographic data presents evidence that
political complexity, i.e. the number of political units, (Johnson, 1982; Carneiro, 1967),
number of organisational traits (Carneiro, 1967) or probability of group fission (Alberti,
2014). For example, the Inuit population on coastal North Alaska is composed of large
groups relying on bowhead whale hunting, a complex coordination task. These popula-
tions are thus under high scalar stress and exhibit a strong hierarchy with leaders who
own the hunting equipment and decide the distribution of resources. In comparison,
smaller groups of Inuits living on the Mackenzie Delta rely on personal hunting and have
a less hierarchical organisation (Friesen, 1999). Other than scalar stress, our findings
predict that low initial inequality and increasing returns to scale are necessary. Much
anthropological evidence shows that inequality was strongly limited in pre-hierarchical
societies because of anti-authoritarian mechanisms, e.g gossip, ostracisation; and the
absence of coercive institutions, e.g. dedicated armies and tax collection (Boehm, 2001).
Increasing returns to scale is commonly observed in human collective actions and
results from synergistic interactions between individuals such as division of labour
and specialisation (Powers and Lehmann, 2017). Archaeological evidence suggests
that agriculture could have provided Neolithic society with such scalable means of
production (Bocquet-Appel, 2011).
Put in perspective, the results of the model show that informal hierarchy evolves
when the cost of organisation is high enough. Unfortunately, measures of cost of organ-
isation are limited, in particular in past societies. Yet, a collective task can carry high
cost of organisation because it involves a very large number of coordination problems,
e.g. distribution of the roles, technical details, time management, etc.. In addition, the
difficulty to organise these tasks is amplified by the number of people involved, which
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unlike the model presented can go up to hundred thousands, e.g. kingdoms, or millions,
e.g. European Union. Importantly, not only collective tasks incur a cost of organisation.
For instance, institutional rules are designed by collective decision-making, and require
to be often updated because their efficiency depend of many dynamic variables, e.g.
social, environmental or historical factors (Ostrom, 1990). The development of a large
number of institutional rules at the Neolithic transition could also have increased the
need for efficient organisation (Powers et al., 2016) Nevertheless, the generality of a
scenario where organisation drives the evolution of hierarchy needs to be better estim-
ated with further work exploring the relation between individual behaviours, group
size and cost of organisation either in laboratory experiments or in real-world human
groups.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the opinion formation model is a simplification of col-
lective decision-making and is missing some crucial parts of group organisation, e.g.
individual knowledge, network structure. However, it is based on simple and supported
assumptions and already captures the benefit of hierarchy in group organisation. It is
a first step to move from a benefit of hierarchy that is simply assumed in a model to a
more mechanistic explanation. In addition, this model provides a link between the well
developed fields of evolutionary dynamics and social dynamics, which we believe could
provide important insights on the evolution of social organisation in human societies.
Further work can develop the opinion formation model and investigate the effects of
additional factors on the evolution of informal hierarchy.
We have considered here a model of multi-level selection by propagation where
the competition between groups is captured by the difference in number of migrants,
and hierarchy is spread by demic diffusion. This assumption is supported by evidence
showing that agriculture would have spread by demic diffusion rather than by cultural
transmission between groups (Pinhasi et al., 2005). Another possibility to model the
evolution of structured populations is to model groups as the reproductive entities
(sometimes called models of multi-level selection 2 Okasha 2008), by considering that
groups can undergo fission or fusion, e.g. by conquest. This formalisation has the benefit
of capturing intergroup conflict, here ignored. However, ignoring intergroup conflict is
conservative because conflicts between groups would only increase the competition
between individuals of different groups and thus lead to the same qualitative result.
In addition, the model presented here still gives insights on the role of intergroup
conflict. It is likely that warfare would favour hierarchy because it is a task with high
time constraints and it results in larger group size, which are both factors that we
have shown to correlate with hierarchy. In a similar way, we do not consider that
groups can disappear and get reformed by migration from the first group, i.e. propagule
model. Although propagule models apply well to organisms such as bacteria, it make the
assumption that humans groups can often collapse. However, our choice is conservative
because a propagule model would also increase the selection pressure at the group level
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and thus would favour the evolution of hierarchy. Finally, we considered that group size
and productivity can differ among patches (as observed in real-world). This assumption
is important because it reduces the competition among related individuals and allows
the indirect benefit of the trait to influence selection (which otherwise is cancelled out
by the competition among related individuals Taylor 1992).
Our model, combined with previous research (Powers and Lehmann, 2014), shows
that a functional hypothesis is a plausible scenario to explain the transition to hier-
archy. Expanding human groups switch to hierarchy in an informal or institutional way
(Powers and Lehmann, 2014) to limit the costs of large-scale organisation. However,
if both forms of hierarchy provide a benefit to group organisation, institutional hier-
archy requires costly political institutions. Thus, why does institutional hierarchy is so
prevalent despite its additional costs? We investigate this question in the next chapter.
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[ Fifth Chapter \
The evolution of institutionalised
hierarchy
Human social hierarchy has the unique characteristic of existing in two forms. Firstly,
as an informal hierarchy where leaders and followers are implicitly defined by their
personal characteristics, and secondly, as an institutional hierarchy where leaders and
followers are explicitly appointed by group decision. Although both forms can reduce
the time spent in organising collective tasks (as shown in Chapter 4 and Powers and
Lehmann 2014), institutional hierarchy imposes additional costs. It is therefore natural
to question why it emerges at all. We propose that the key difference lies in the fact that
institutions can create hierarchy with only a single leader, which is unlikely to occur
in unregulated informal hierarchy. In this chapter, we investigate if this difference can
explain the evolution of cultural preferences toward institutional hierarchy, despite its
additional costs.
5.1 Contribution
In this Chapter 5, we demonstrate that individuals evolve cultural preferences towards
institutional hierarchy because (i) it provides a greater organisational advantage than
informal hierarchy, (ii) reduces the detrimental effect of group size and (iii) is more
resilient in the face of inequality on the time spent to organise collective actions.
5.2 Publication
The majority of the work in this chapter has been published as:
• Cedric Perret, Emma Hart and Simon T.Powers Being a leader or being the leader:
The evolution of institutionalised hierarchy, Proceedings of Artificial Life Confer-
ence 2019, MIT Press, 2019
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5.3 Introduction
Why do humans choose their leaders? A meta-analysis of sixty independent studies
shows that leadership effectiveness is not always correlated with leadership emergence
(Judge et al., 2002). In other words, groups sometimes choose incompetent individuals
as leaders. For instance, experiments on leader choice showed that “evaluations of
beauty explain success in real elections better than evaluations of competence, intelli-
gence, likability, or trustworthiness” (Berggren et al., 2010). Yet, despite these risks, most
modern human hierarchies spend time and resources to explicitly choose leaders, even
if efficient leaders are already designated by their characteristics and skills.
Human social hierarchy has the unique characteristic of existing in two forms (Piel-
stick, 2000). Firstly, as an informal hierarchy where leaders and followers are implicitly
defined by their personal characteristics, and secondly, as a formal hierarchy where
leaders and followers are explicitly appointed by decision. We call the formal hierarchy
here institutional hierarchy to stress that it is supported by institutional rules, which
are created by group decision and actively enforced by monitoring and punishment
(Ostrom, 1990; Hurwicz, 1996). The emergence of informal (as seen in Chapter 4 or insti-
tutional hierarchy (Powers and Lehmann, 2014) can both be explained by the fact that
they reduce costs of organisation. However, institutional hierarchies are surprisingly
pervasive in modern societies, given that they carry additional costs in comparison to
informal ones. First, institutions need to be created (and updated) and thus institutional
rules need to be agree upon. As we have seen in Chapter 3, collective decision-making
can be a long process and is likely to be even longer for a sensitive topic such as the dis-
tribution of power. Second, institutions need to be enforced. For example, individuals
trying to usurp the power need to be punished.
We propose that a key to this puzzle lies in the particularity of institutions which
allow humans to hand-tune their behaviours, e.g. by designating a single leader, in
comparison to informal hierarchies in which leaders emerge through evolutionary
processes. In informal hierarchies, the mutations combined to the conflicting selection
forces create variations in individual traits and the number of leaders. As shown in
chapter 3, hierarchy with a single and strongly influential leader in comparison to
multiple leaders hierarchy leads to bigger reductions in (i) the time to consensus, (ii)
the variation in the time to consensus, and (iii) the increase in time to consensus as
group size increases. However, it remains unclear whether this difference could drive
the appearance of institutional hierarchies when informal hierarchy is in place.
Currently, independent explanations for the evolution of informal (Chapter 4) and
institutional hierarchy (Powers and Lehmann, 2014) have been provided, but there is no
model that investigates the competition between these two forms of social organisation.
To fill this gap, we modify the evolutionary model developed in Chapter 4 such that
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individuals can choose between informal social organisation where the influence of
individuals is defined by individuals’ characteristics, or institutional social organisation
where the influence of individuals are defined by the institution. Using this model, we
aim to answer the following question
Research question. Can the organisational advantage of single leader hierarchy drive
the evolution of preferences toward institutionalised hierarchy despite the additional cost
of institutions?
5.4 Model definition
We extend the evolutionary model presented in chapter 4 to integrate institutional
hierarchy. To do so, we define political organisation as the process by which leaders and
followers are defined. The political organisation of a group can either be informal, i.e.
leaders and followers are defined by default by individual characteristics, or institutional,
i.e. leaders and followers are defined by group decision.
5.4.1 Model outline and life cycle
Individuals are still described by a value of influence α as previously. However, the
influence is not anymore an evolving trait but is either defined by an individual social
personality s in an informal hierarchy, or by their assigned individual social position in
institutional hierarchy. Individuals carry two evolving traits: their social personality s
and their preference for political organisation h. The trait s represents the intrinsic per-
sonality of an individual in a social interaction (e.g. talkativeness, boldness, charisma).
In an informal organisation, it defines an individual’s influence α and in this case, is
equivalent to the evolving trait described in previous chapter 5. In an institutional
organisation, the trait s affects the probability to be chosen as a leader. Unlike previous
model, the social personality is a discrete trait and can be either dominant s = 1, or
compliant s = 0. Thus, we define social organisation by the proportion of leaders and
followers present in a patch. In a similar way, we consider that only two profiles of
influence: leader L, and follower F. Each profile has a fixed value of influence α such
that αL >αF. We do this simplification because the results of chapter 4 shows that even
when considering a continuous trait, two profiles (leader and follower) emerge. In addi-
tion, it simplifies the model to focus more on the evolution of institutional hierarchy.
The trait h represents the preference in terms of political organisation of an individual:
0 represents a preference for informal organisation, and 1 a preference for institutional
organisation.
The two traits s,h carried by individuals are transmitted vertically from parent to
offspring, e.g. by social learning as is common in hunter-gatherer groups (Hewlett et al.,
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2011). They mutate following a mutation rate of µ. As these traits are assumed to be at
least partly cultural, the mutation rate is higher than for a classical genetic trait. When a
mutation occurs, the trait value is flipped.
We consider an island model with a population of individuals that is subdivided
into a finite number of patches Np (Wright, 1931). The life cycle consists of discrete and
non-overlapping generations as follows:
1. Individuals decide whether to create an institutional hierarchy and appoint a
leader (equation 5.1; or defaults to an informal organisation where leaders and
followers roles are defined by individuals’ personality s. Individuals creating an
institutional hierarchy pay a cost ch.
2. Individuals play a decision-making game on their patch as defined in Chapter 3.
The time taken to reach consensus is translated into an opportunity cost of organ-
isation (equation 5.2).
3. After consensus is reached, all individuals on a patch take part in a collective
task which produces an amount of extra resource, discounted by the cost of
organisation (equation 5.3).
4. The resource obtained from the collective task is distributed among all individuals
on the patch. Leaders get a surplus of resources modulated by a parameter d
which modulates the inequality between leaders and followers (equation 5.4)
5. Individuals produce a number of offspring drawn from a Poisson distribution,
with the mean determined by the resources received (equation 5.5)
6. All individuals of the previous generation perish.
7. Offspring migrate with a fixed probability m. Migrating individuals enter a patch
chosen at random from the population (excluding their natal patch).
5.4.2 Political organisation
Each group within a patch is defined by a political organisation h∗. At the beginning of
each generation, individuals decide if they want to design an institutional hierarchy and
appoint a leader (h∗ = 1); this occurs if the majority of individuals in the group have a
preference toward institutional hierarchy:
h∗ = 0 i f 1
N j (t )
N j (t )∑
i
hi j (t ) < 0.5
h∗ = 1 i f 1
N j (t )
N j (t )∑
i
hi j (t ) > 0.5
(5.1)
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In the absence of institutions (h∗ = 0), a group is organised by default as an informal
hierarchy. In an institutional hierarchy, one single leader is randomly selected from the
individuals with dominant personality s = 1 and its influence is set to αl. In absence of
individuals with dominant personality, the leader is randomly selected from all indi-
viduals within the group. The rest of the individuals within the patch adopt a follower
profile and their influences are set to αf (independently of their social personality). In
an informal hierarchy, an individual’s influence α is defined by its social personality
with αl for dominant individuals s = 1 and αf for compliant individuals s = 0. In order
to be sustainable, institutions require resources to monitor individuals and punish
transgressors (Ostrom, 1990). Thus, individuals creating an institutional hierarchy pay
a cost ch. It is worth noting that we constrain an institutional group to be a hierarchy,
but a group can have an informal political organisation with either an egalitarian or
hierarchical social organisation.
5.4.3 Organisation by decision-making
Once individuals have chosen their political organisation, they organise a collective
task through group decision-making as described in Chapter 3. The consensus time is
translated into a cost of organisation:
(5.2) Coj(t ) = t∗j Ct
The cost of organisation comes from the time dedicated to organisation instead of
carrying out the actual task – groups that take too long to reach a decision may lose
resources or pay other opportunity costs. This cost is modulated by Ct, which is a
parameter representing the time constraint on decision-making and depends of the
limitation of time on the task, for instance, the speed of depletion of resources or the
need to build defences before an enemy arrives. We consider here that the final decision
reached has no effect on the benefit produced by the collective task – the benefit is only
affected by the time taken to reach consensus.
5.4.4 Collective task
At each generation, individuals take part in a collective task and produce additional
resources B j (t ):
(5.3) B j (t ) = βb
1+e−γb(N j (t )−bmid) −Coj(t ).
The collective task simulates the numerous cooperative tasks realised during the life-
time of an individual. It can encompass many actions such as hunting of large game or
construction of an irrigation system. The benefit is calculated from a sigmoid function
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described by βb, bmid and γb, respectively the maximum, the group size at the sig-
moid’s midpoint, and the steepness of the increase in the benefit induced by additional
participants. We assume increasing returns to scale in which additional participants
increase the benefit super-linearly (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). But as is standard in
micro-economic theory, we also make the conservative assumption that the benefit of
the collective task eventually has diminishing marginal returns which overcomes the
increasing returns to scale because of other limiting factors (Foster, 2004).
5.4.5 Distribution of resources
The resources produced by the collective task are distributed between the individuals
on a given patch. The share of an individual, pi j (t ), is equal to:
(5.4) pi j (t ) = 1+ li (t )d∑N j
i=1(1+ li (t )d)
.
We simplify the previous model of chapter 4 by considering that leaders (l = 1) receive a
surplus of resources modulated by the level of ecological inequality d . For d = 0, the
distribution within a patch is egalitarian and the influence of individuals does not affect
the share of each individual. Such a scenario is close to that observed in societies of
pre-Neolithic hunter-gatherers. For d = 1, leaders receive twice the amount a follower
receives. It is assumed for simplicity that d is the same for all patches, and is determined
for example by the state of technology, e.g. food storage and military technologies.
5.4.6 Reproduction
After receiving their share of the additional resources, individuals have a number of
offspring sampled from a Poisson distribution centred on the individual fitness, w . The
fitness of individual i on patch j at time t is described by the following equation, where
N j (t ) is the total number of individual on patch j :
(5.5) wi j (t ) = ra
1+ N j (t )K
+ rbi j (t )− chh∗j − cnsi j .
The fitness of an individual is the sum of an intrinsic growth rate ra limited by the
carrying capacity K , and additional growth rate resulting from the extra resources
produced by the collective task, rbi j (t). The fitness of individuals with institutional
organisation is discounted by a cost of institution ch, which represents the cost to
monitor and enforce the institutional rule. The fitness of dominant individuals is
discounted by a cost of negotiation cn which represents the extra time and resources that
an individual with dominant personality allocates to persuade others. The additional
growth rate rbi j (t ) is calculated as follows:
(5.6) rbi j (t ) =βr(1−e−γr(B j (t )pi j (t ))).
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The term rbi j (t ) is calculated from a logistic function described byγr andβr, respectively
the form and the maximum of the increase in growth rate induced by the additional
resources. The additional resources are given by the total amount of benefit, B j (t),
multiplied by the share the individual receives, pi j (t ). The increase of the growth rate
follows a logistic relation because of the inevitable presence of other limiting factors.
After reproduction, offspring individuals migrate with a probability equal to a fixed
migration rate m. Migrating individuals enter a patch chosen at random from the
population (excluding their natal patch).
5.5 Results
We use this model to answer the following question:
Research question. Can the organisational advantage of single leader hierarchy drive
the evolution of preferences toward institutionalised hierarchy despite the additional cost
of institutions?
Because of the non-linearities of the model, which result from the interactions of
all of the variables, we analyse it using replicated numerical simulations. The initial
values of the social personality of individuals, s are sampled on a discrete uniform
distribution on {0,1}. The initial values of preference for political organisation h are
set to 0 to represent the initial absence of institutions. We focus on the effect of the
following parameters: (i) the level of ecological inequality d because inequality limits
the evolution of informal hierarchy, (ii) the cost of institution Ch because it is the
main limit to the evolution of institutional hierarchy and (iii) the time constraint Ct
because it affects the benefit provided by hierarchy. The default parameters are for
the consensus threshold xθ = 0.05, the number of listeners Nl = 50, the influence of
leaders αl = 0.75 and the influence of followers αf = 0.25. The default parameters used
in the simulations, unless otherwise specified, are Np = 50, N j (0) = 20, K = 20, ra = 2,
βb = 10000, γb = 0.005, bmid = 250, βr = 3, γr = 0.05, µm = 0.01 and m = 0.05. These
parameters are chosen in order to allow the transition between tribe size (50 to 100
individuals) to chiefdom size (500 individuals). Finally, we want to allow for hierarchy
even when the political organisation is informal. To do so, we choose a high cost of
negotiation CN which limits the evolution of too many leaders and allows relatively
stable informal hierarchy. The results presented are the mean across patches and
32 replicates when the result is as a function of generations; and across patches, 32
replicates and 5000 generations when the results are as a function of a parameter. Where
the result is described as a mean, it is the mean value across patches. The error bars
represent the standard error from the mean and are not represented when they are too
small to be visible (< 5% of the maximum value).
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Figure 5.1: Evolution of the distribution of political organisation h∗ (colour) and mean propor-
tion of individuals with preferences towards institutional hierarchy as a function of generations.
































Figure 5.2: (A) Evolution of mean additional resources B (dark) equal to total resources produced
discounted by cost of organisation Co (light) across generations. (B) Evolution of mean group
size across generations. The values presented are the average across 32 replicates.
Figure 5.1 demonstrates that for a moderate cost of institution, individual pref-
erences evolve towards institutional hierarchy and thus, most of groups switch from
informal to institutional hierarchy. Groups have in average only slightly more than 50%
of individuals with preference toward institutional hierarchy because having any pro-
portion above 50% has the same effect on political organisation and therefore the same
effect on the fitness of all individuals within the group. The small proportion of groups
with informal hierarchy are explained by the cost of the institution and random muta-
tions in individual’s preferences, which can lead some groups to temporarily switch
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Figure 5.3: (A) mean additional resources B (dark) equal to total resources produced discounted
by cost of organisation Co (light), and (B) mean group size between simulations where are
only allowed either institutional, informal or both organisations. The values presented are the
average across 32 replicates.
back to informal hierarchy. The prevalence of institutional hierarchy remains stable
for long period (5000 generations). Figure 5.2 shows that the total amount of resources
produced and thus the group size increases through time. The cost of organisation also
increases but remains low enough so that a large group provides more resources than a
small group. Figure 5.2 shows that two increases in production and group size happen.
The first corresponds to the emergence of informal hierarchy, and the second to the
subsequent emergence of institutional hierarchy. This result and the results presented
in Figure 5.3 demonstrate that institutional hierarchy allows a higher production and
a larger group size. This is because a group with institutional hierarchy has (i) a lower
cost of organisation (as seen in Chapter 3 single leader hierarchy has the shortest time
to consensus) and, (ii) a larger production of surplus resources due to the larger size
they reach. When both types of organisation are allowed, groups reach an intermediate
size and productivity because of the cost of institution and the presence of a minority
of small groups with informal hierarchy. To summarise, groups developing institutional
hierarchy strongly reduce their cost of organisation. They grow larger, which improve
their productivity, while hierarchy limits the increase in the cost of organisation. As
a consequence, these groups export a greater number of migrants, who carry their
cultural preferences for institutions to other groups, leading to the global spread of
institutions.
Figure 5.4 shows that an increase in the cost of institution Ch reduces the proportion
of institutional hierarchy and the average group size. This result is explained by the high
cost of institution overcoming the benefit brought by institutional hierarchy. However,
institutional hierarchy still evolves even for a moderate cost of institutions. Indeed, a
cost of 1 means that all individuals within a group need a growth rate twice higher and
thus, need to produce approximately twice as much resources to sustain the same fitness
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of (A) political organisation h∗ and (B) mean group size as a function of
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Figure 5.5: (A) Distribution of political organisation h∗ as a function of time constraint Ct. (B)
Distribution of political organisation h∗ as a function of level of ecological inequality d with
Ch = 1
. The values presented are the average across 32 replicates and 5000 generations.
(see equation 5.5). Moreover, Figure 5.4 shows that individuals develop institutional
hierarchy even if it doesn’t significantly modify the average group size, e.g. same size
between Ch = 1 and Ch = 2. This is explained by single-leader hierarchy providing a
more constant organisational benefit than the multiple leaders of informal hierarchy.
Figure 5.5.A shows that a larger proportion of groups develop institutional hierarchy
when the time constraints on the decision-making Ct is high, e.g. a time limited task
such as warfare. This is because the shorter consensus time brought by single-leader
hierarchy has more consequences on the absolute group production.
Figure 5.5.B shows that a higher proportion of groups develop institutional hierarchy
when the level of ecological inequality d is higher. This result is explained by Figure 5.6
which shows that the benefit provided by institutional hierarchy persists even under
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Informal Institutional Both



































Figure 5.6: (A) Mean distribution of social personality and (B) mean group size as a function of
the level of ecological inequality d . The values presented are the average across 32 replicates
and 5000 generations.
high inequality. On the contrary, Figure 5.6.A shows that in an informal organisation, an
increase in the level of inequality leads to an increase in the number of leaders. This
results in a collapse of hierarchy, a high cost of organisation and smaller group size
(Figure 5.6.B). This difference in the effect of inequality is explained by institutional
hierarchy having only one expressed leader even if multiple individuals want to be
leaders. In addition, only one individual attains the status of leader and hence receives
a surplus of resources, which ultimately limits the increase in number of dominant
individuals.
5.6 Discussion
Human social hierarchy can be formed because individuals act as leaders and followers,
i.e. informal hierarchy, or because certain individuals are chosen as leaders and follow-
ers, i.e. institutional hierarchy. But why do human groups create costly institutional
hierarchies if hierarchy already emerges naturally from individual behaviours? One
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key difference is that single leaders can appear in institutional hierarchy designed by
group decision, but are highly unlikely in informal organisation shaped by evolution
of personality traits. In Chapter 3, we have shown that institutional hierarchy with a
single leader leads to bigger reductions in (i) the consensus time, (ii) the variation in
the consensus time, and (iii) the increase in consensus time as a group grows. The
evolutionary model developed here demonstrates that this difference results in the
evolution of individuals’ preferences toward institutional hierarchy, even if this has an
additional cost.
Previous theoretical work have investigated the emergence of either informal or
institutional hierarchy, but ignored the competition between the two forms. Powers
and Lehmann (2014) developed an evolutionary model in which individuals favour
institutional hierarchy over an egalitarian organisation. The model presented in chapter
4 has shown that a similar process can drive the evolution of individuals towards leader
and follower behaviours, thus creating an informal hierarchy. We confirm and connect
these works by showing that institutional hierarchy can be favoured over informal
hierarchy because it provides additional benefit to group decision-making, in terms of
consensus time.
Our model predicts that institutional hierarchy evolves when (i) group size is high
(and so productivity and cost of organisation are high), and (ii) inequality is high.
These predictions fit with the environmental and social changes observed following
the advent of agriculture (Bocquet-Appel, 2011; Mattison et al., 2016). However, our
model also predicts that the productivity benefit of institutional hierarchies can be
counterbalanced by a high cost of institutions. It is hard to evaluate the costs implied
by institutions, but it is worth noting that they result mostly from the resources and
time allocated to monitor and punish individuals not complying with the rules, i.e. here
individuals trying to become leaders. Our model has shown that institutional hierarchy
limits the number of individuals aspiring to become leaders, and thus suggests that the
costs of institutions remain limited even in large groups. Integrating the explicit process
by which individuals are monitored and punished could give further insights.
It is worth noting that instead of competing, the two forms of political organisa-
tion could have interacted and even facilitated the development of each other. First,
informal hierarchy could have facilitated the development of institutional hierarchy. On
the one hand, the development of informal hierarchy creates favourable conditions for
institutional hierarchy, i.e. higher group size and higher inequality. On the other hand,
informal hierarchy could have provided enough influence to some individuals for them
to convince the rest of the group to create institutional hierarchy. By doing so, they could
have strengthen and legitimated their position. Such possibility could be explored by
explicitly describing the collective decision-making by which the institution is created.
Second, institutional hierarchy could have led to the development of informal hier-
archy. Indeed, the influence of an individual is in truth defined by both an individual’s
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personality and its social position. Thus, institutional hierarchy could have driven
the evolution of few individuals toward a more extreme leader personality because it
increases their chance to be chosen as leader or increases their efficiency as leader.
Integrating a composite value of influence in this model could provide more insight into
this interaction between these two forms of political organisation. In conclusion, these
explanations for the emergence of institutional hierarchy are not mutually exclusive
with the one presented here and if our results do not settle the question, they show that
institutional hierarchy could have emerged first and indepently. Measuring the cost of
organisation in informal and institutional hierarchy for instance in experiments, would
help understand how critical and general is this explanation.
Importantly, stable single-leader hierarchy could theoretically exist in informal
hierarchy if individuals have conditional behaviour, e.g. an individual choose to be
follower if at least one individual is already a leader. However, it is unlikely in absence
of institutions because it would require that an individual monitor and remember the
behaviours of all other members of the group. Doing so would carry a high cognitive
and time cost, in particular in large groups. Nonetheless, it could be made possible if
leaders are heavily signaled and promoted. Further work on the evolution of conditional
leader and follower would provide a crucial test to the presented explanation.
In this model, we have explored only one form of institution and one function
of hierarchy. It would be interesting to explore other types of institutions, such as
those allowing multiple levels of hierarchy, or restrict the number of people involved
in the decision-making, as found in representative democracy. Other functions of
hierarchy could also be investigated, e.g. to enforce cooperation (Hooper et al., 2010).
However, it is worth noting that extending the model to integrate the possibility of
voting for more leaders would carry similar qualitative results with individuals evolving
a preference toward one leader. The presence of multiples leaders appears only later in
human history, with the rise of complex states composed of multiple layers of hierarchy
(Spencer, 1990).
We have considered only one form of group decision-making for choosing whether
or not the group has institutional hierarchy, knowingly a majority rule. However, in real
world, the decision for institutional hierarchy can be the result of more complex voting
systems. Future work could investigate how different rules affect the emergence of
institutional hierarchy. As a first step, the majority rule could be replaced by a sigmoid
function which gives a probability of having institution as a function of the number
of individuals with preferences toward institutional hierarchy. In this case, we would
expect that the mean proportion of individuals with preferences towards institutional
hierarchy evolve to a high value rather than remaining just above 0.5 as observed here.
Finally, we considered that the leader is chosen among individuals with dominant
personality. Choosing the leader among any individuals (dominant and compliant) or
choosing the leader following preset rules, e.g. heritable leadership, should remove the
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benefit of dominant personality in institutional hierarchy. This would reduce the pro-
portion of dominant personalities. Ultimately, this could reduce the cost of institutional
hierarchy because less individuals would need to be punished for not complying with
their assigned roles of follower. Future work integrating explicitly the cost of institu-
tion i.e. monitoring and punishing, could provide a better insight in these situations.
Such extension would be particularly relevant to explore the emergence of heritable
leadership.
Institutions are believed to be crucial innovations for the emergence of human
societies. We have shown here that one of their major benefit is to provide humans
with a finer tool to modify their behaviour, which can be crucial for some processes
such as shown here with hierarchy. More than a new innovation, the development of
institutions marks a transition in the dynamics shaping human behaviours: from long
and blind evolutionary process to fast cultural dynamics.
The first part of the ”iron law of oligarchy” states that influential leaders and in-
flueanceable followers will emerge to facilitate group organisation, as group grows. In
this chapter and chapter4, we have shown that this explanation is a viable scenario,
which fits with the evolution theory. The second part of the iron law of oligarchy pro-
poses that once few individuals have a high influence, they can use this influence to bias
opinions and impose inequality. We investigate this statement using an evolutionary
point of view in the next Chapter 6.
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[ Sixth Chapter \
The evolution of despotism in
hierarchical societies
In previous models of evolution of hierarchy (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), social hierarchy
creates inequality because influential leaders bias the decision and receive a higher
share of resources. Yet this explanation is limited because leaders’ behaviours are still
constrained indirectly by the satisfaction of the rest of the group.
6.1 Contribution
In this Chapter 6, we demonstrate that leaders in hierarchical societies evolve despotic
behaviour despite the control of followers. We show that a transition from equality to
despotism will happen in presence of (i) highly influential individuals with a preferential
access of resources; and (ii) weakly connected followers. We show that this is because
influential leaders are able to bias followers opinion, thus jeopardising the followers’
capacity to monitor and punish despotic leaders.
6.2 Publication
The majority of the work in this chapter has been published as:
• Cedric Perret, Simon T.Powers, Jeremy Pitt and Emma Hart, Can justice be fair
when it is blind? How social network structures can promote or prevent the evol-
ution of despotism, Proceedings of Artificial Life Conference 2018, MIT Press,
2018
6.3 Introduction
Hierarchical societies are defined by a skewed distribution of power but also resources.
In human societies, leaders tend to evolve despotic behaviour where they exploit fol-
lowers in order to increase their own fitness (Hayden and Villeneuve, 2010; Hayden,
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2001; Betzig, 1982). Common explanations to explain the emergence of despotism
emphasise the importance of transmissible surplus resources (Mattison et al., 2016),
the capacity of followers to avoid domination, and the ability of leaders to impose
domination (Johnstone, 2000; Summers, 2005). However, these factors are limited to
explain the emergence of despotism in the first place because pre-Neolithic tribes had
strong anti-authoritarian mechanisms, by which they had been able to avoid leaders’
domination for long period (Boehm, 2001).
In the absence of means to build up economic or military power, leaders could
have established their dominance by accumulating political power, i.e. influence over
collective decisions (Michels, 1911). To cope with the complexity inherent to large-scale
coordination, human societies tend to facilitate collective decision-making by switching
to hierarchy with a minority of influential individuals, i.e. leaders, and a majority of
influenceable individuals, i.e. followers. It has been suggested that the sole skewned
distribution of political power, i.e. influence over collective decision, is enough to lead
to inequality and despotism (Michels, 1911). This is because leaders might exert this
influence to leverage institutional rules and bias collective decisions, and ultimately tilt
the distribution of cost and benefits toward their own advantage. For instance, being
the one deciding of the distribution of lands provides an easy way to appropriate the
most productive lands for itself.
Using this bias on collective decisions, leaders would have been able to accumulate
economic and military power, which can then be used to impose dominance on the
rest of the groups. But although leaders have a huge influence on collective decisions
in hierarchical societies, leaders’ behaviours are still constrained indirectly by the sat-
isfaction of the rest of the group. In particular, hierarchy first emerges in egalitarian
tribes with strong anti-authoritarian mechanisms to control aspiring leaders (Boehm,
2001). It might have been difficult for an individual to accumulate economical power
via its influence without being punished for doing so. In response to too despotic rules,
followers can start a revolution to overthrow the leader. This form of justice, where
individuals judge how institutions and decision-makers treat them, is defined as inter-
actional justice (Schermerhorn, 2012), and is a common way in which individuals exert
control over their institutions in human societies. Nevertheless, such control could
have been limited because followers often lack direct knowledge of leaders’ behaviours
and decisions. To control leaders, followers judge decision-makers by the state of the
laws and rules they manage. The flaw of this system is that the monitoring of leaders
is dependent of individuals having an accurate knowledge of the state of the system.
This knowledge is often incomplete because of the size and complexity of large human
groups. In particular, individuals first need to make a self-assessment of how they are
being treated, i.e. build their own opinion from their personal experiences; and then
make a collective assessment about whether to try to induce change, i.e. aggregate the
opinions of other individuals. On the one hand, this kind of opinion formation based
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on individual and social learning produces a global assessment of the current state of
institutions. On the other hand, it is also susceptible to manipulation and false opinions.
For instance, a leader could spread a view of the state of the system which is false but
advantageous to himself.
We have shown in Chapter 3 that leaders’ influence on decision can result from their
influence on others’ opinions. In addition, leaders are often surrounded by a clique –
a limited number of highly influential individuals, such as a patriarchal clan in early
agricultural societies (Kaplan et al., 2009) or key policy-makers in contemporaneous
communities (Miller, 1958). By providing them with preferential access to resources,
leaders can cause the clique to have a positive opinion, which they then spread through-
out the group as a result of their high connectedness. The opinion of followers thus
becomes biased by the clique, blinding them to the actual level of inequality. This
blindness could eventually limit the control of followers on the leader’s decisions. In
recent work, Pitt (2017) modelled this process and has formally demonstrated that a
centralised social network with a leader and a clique biases the transfer of knowledge,
and ultimately leads to misconceptions on the current fairness level of the society. From
this, it was predicted that an incomplete transfer of knowledge could blind the interac-
tional justice of followers and could allow the evolution of despotic leaders. However,
this prediction has remained untested so far.
To investigate this prediction, we build a model to simulate the evolution of despot-
ism. Individuals are described by their preferences on the distribution of resources, and
their opinions on the actual level of fairness in the society. We integrate the interac-
tional justice process, i.e. self assessment and global assessment of leader’s decision
on the distribution of resources. Whether a leader remains in power is controlled by
the overall satisfaction of group members, as determined by their joint assessment of
leaders’ behaviour. Opinions on leader’s decisions are likely to be shaped by social
links along a long period of time rather than in a short and disordered manner as seen
in collective decision-making. Thus and to connect to previous work (Pitt, 2017), we
describe social organisation of a group by its network structure, with hierarchy being
described by a centralized network with the leader and its clique as the central node.
We use a Moran process (Moran, 1958; Lieberman et al., 2005) to simulate the evolution
of their distribution preferences 1 and investigate the following question:
Research question. Does a centralised social network structure lead to the evolution of
despotism in hierarchical societies ?
1Moran process is a stochastic process that can be used to model evolution in finite population with
overlapping generations. It describes a sequence of event, in which one individual is replaced by another
individual. Fitness increases the probability of an individual to replace the dead individual. For more
details, see (Moran, 1958; Otto and Day, 2007).
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6.4 Model definition
To investigate the impact of social network structure on the evolution of despotism, we
have developed a model to simulate the evolution of distribution preferences within
a hierarchical society. This section provides an outline of the model with a detailed
description of the mechanisms implemented: the network structure, the distribution of
resources, the interactional justice and the reproduction.
6.4.1 Model outline and life cycle
We consider a fixed-size population of N individuals explicitly organised in a directed
network. The population is composed of one leader deciding of the distribution of
resources and N − 1 followers. In addition, the population is divided between Nc
highly influential individuals called clique members which includes the leader, and No
individuals with low influence called outgroup members . The life cycle consists of:
1. The group produces an amount of resource that is distributed amongst group
members according to the distribution preference of the leader, zL (Equation 6.3).
2. Each individual builds its own subjective mindset about the fairness of resource
allocation, m, as a function of the resources it personally received and its own
distribution preference (Equation 6.4).
3. Each individual builds its opinion about the overall fairness of the resource distri-
bution, o, by aggregating its own mindset and the mindsets of the neighbouring
individuals (individuals linked to the focal individual) (Equation 6.5).
4. Each individual compares its opinion to its distribution preference z. If the
opinion is higher than the preference, the individual is considered defiant and
pays a cost to attempt a revolution.
5. In case of a large proportion of defiant individuals within the population, i.e.
above a revolution threshold T , a new leader and clique are chosen within the
defiant individuals. The network is then rebuilt.
6. A random individual dies and is replaced by another individual with a probability
proportional to its fitness (Equation 6.1). This reproductive process is repeated R
times.
Individuals are modelled by one cultural trait; their distribution preference z defined
between equal (z = 0) and strongly skewed (z = 1). In leaders, this trait zL is translated
into the function defining the distribution of resources with zL = 0 representing a
fair leader and zL = 1 a despotic leader. In followers, this trait is translated into their
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tolerance towards inequality, with the minimum z = 0 equal to no tolerance and the
maximum z = 1 equal to the maximum tolerance where any level of despotism is
accepted. The agents are also indirectly described by their influence α, here translated
into the probability that the focal node is connected toward another individual. The
trait z evolves following a Moran process (Moran, 1958; Lieberman et al., 2005). In
addition, when a new individual is born, its trait z can mutate at a rate µz. When a
mutation occurs, a random value is sampled from a truncated Gaussian distribution
centered on the current value of the trait, with variance σz.
6.4.2 Network structures
To study how hierarchy can affect the evolution of despotism, we explicitly describe the
social structure of the population by a directed social network. In this network, each
node represents an individual and each directed link represents a social contact from
one individual to another. We define the in-degree and the out-degree of an individual
as the number of links connected respectively toward and from this focal node. The
influence of an individual is taken to be its connectednessα defined as the probability of
an individual to be connected toward another individual. To build the network, we use
an algorithm derived from the Erdős–Rényi model (Erdős and Renyi, 1959) as follows:
1. The leader and all members of the clique are fully connected.
2. For each individual, a directed link is created from the individual i to the indi-
vidual j following a probability αc if the focal individual i is member of the clique
or is the leader, and αo if the focal individual i is a follower.
If a node is not connected to any individual at the end of the algorithm, one link is
added from that node towards a randomly chosen individual. The network structure
is then described by the value of αc and αo . We consider a network as random when
αc =αo , and as centralised when αc >αo .
6.4.3 Reproduction
We consider here the evolutionary process as only cultural evolution (Boyd and Richer-
son, 1985). The evolution of the population is modelled by a Moran Process (Moran,
1958; Lieberman et al., 2005). This has been shown to be an efficient method to study
evolution in finite populations and keeps the size of the population constant. The repro-
duction follows a death-birth process. At each time step, a randomly chosen individual
dies. Then, the vacant node is replaced by the offspring of an individual chosen within
the population with a probability proportional to its fitness, i.e. fitness-proportionate
selection. The individual chosen to die is also competing to fill the vacant node with
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one of its own offspring. More formally, the new individual has a probability P (i ) to be
the offspring of individual i according to :
P (i )(t ) = wi (t )∑N
j=1 w j (t )
,(6.1)
with N the population size, wi the fitness of an individual, and j = 0 the individual
previously occupying the node. We assume that a vacant node can be replaced by
any other individual in the population, i.e. the individual changing its distribution
preference can learn from the observation of any other individual. Because we consider
the opinion formation to happen on a longer time scale than the evolution of cultural
items, this process is repeated R times by generation. The fitness is determinate by the
distribution of resources.
6.4.4 Distribution of resources
At each round, the group produces a fixed amount of resources B = 2N . The resources
are distributed as a function of the social position si of the individual, with the social
position of the leader, clique and followers being respectively 0, 1 and 2. The fitness
wi (t ) of an individual i at a time t is equivalent to the resources received:
wi (t ) = B ∗ f (si (t ))(6.2)
The function defining the distribution f (si (t )) is modulated by the leader preference zL
such that :
f (si (t )) = e
−si (t )∗zL(t )∑N
j=1−e s j (t )∗zL(t )
(6.3)
The distribution of resources is normalised and is bounded between an equal distribu-
tion of resources (with z = 0) and a strongly skewed distribution of resources (with z = 1
). We make the assumption that the leader has full control on collective decision. This
is a common assumption in the literature on the evolution of despotism (Buston et al.,
2007).
6.4.5 Interactional justice
Each individual i has an opinion oi (t) describing its view of the current fairness of
the society. It is the result of its own mindset mi (t), which is calculated from its own
personal experience, and the mindset of its incoming social neighbours. First, an indi-
vidual’s mindset is calculated by comparing the resources it received with an egalitarian
distribution:
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The mindset is normalised by the difference between the maximum share 1/N and the
minimum possible share pmi n . As a result, the mindset is not dependant of the absolute
amount of resources produced B . The opinion oi (t ) of individual i is then calculated as:
oi (t ) =
mi (t )L+∑kj=1 m j (t )
ki (t )+L
,(6.5)
with j an incoming neighbour, ki (t) the in-degree of the focal node, and L a weight
determining the relative importance of its own experience compared to the mindset of
neighbours.
The variables m and o are bounded between 0 (totally satisfied) and 1 (totally dissatis-
fied). An individual is considered defiant if its opinion value is more than its tolerance
threshold zi (t ). A defiant individual then pays a cost to attempt a revolution C . In case
of a large proportion of defiant individuals within the population, i.e. above a revolution
threshold T , the current leader and clique become outgroup members and a new leader
and clique are chosen from the defiant individuals. The network is then rebuilt.
6.5 Results
To provide a comprehensive investigation of our research question, we perform two
analyses. In our first analysis, we consider that only the leader expresses its distribution
preference zL and that followers’ distribution preference z f is fixed. Then, we combine
mathematical analysis and numerical simulations to study the effect of the network
structure, e.g. αc and αo on the evolution of despotism. In our second analysis, we
relax this assumption and use numerical simulations to allow both leader and follower
preferences to evolve. We define the level of despotism as the level of inequality imposed
by the leader which is here its distribution preference zL .
6.5.1 Analysis 1: Evolution of despotism level with fixed followers’
tolerance
We consider first that only the leader expresses z and that followers’ distribution prefer-
ence z f is fixed. The fitness of the leader wL(t ) is equal to:
(6.6) wL(t ) = 1∑N
i=1−e si∗zL(t )
.
It can be shown that the derivative of the fitness function wL(t ) with respect to the level
























































Figure 6.1: Mean value of the evolutionary stable point z∗ in function of the connectedness
of the clique αc and connectedness of the outgroup αo . The values presented are the average
across 100 replicates.
In other words, an increase in the level of despotism zL always increases the fitness
of the leader and should be positively selected. However, it can exist a value z∗ of the
leader trait zL between 0 and 1 for which the group undergoes a revolution. In this
case, the leader becomes a follower and its trait z no longer affects the distribution of
resources. When the tolerance of followers is fixed, the distribution of resources is the
only selection pressure existing on z. Consequently, the level of despotism zL will evolve
towards the stable point z∗ defined as the maximum value of z for which a revolution
will not occur 2.
The value of this evolutionary stable point is a function of the network structure,
i.e. αc and αo , for a given followers’ tolerance and revolution threshold. Because it is
not possible to analytically calculate z∗, we use numerical simulations to determinate
its value as a function of αc and αo . The default parameters used in the simulations,
unless otherwise specified, are N = 500, Nc = 25, L = 1, T = 0.1, z f = 0.25, R = 100. For
each set of parameters considered, 100 independent simulations have been realised.
The results presented, unless otherwise specified, are the mean value of replicates.
Figure 6.1.A demonstrates that centralisation of the network structure leads to a
higher level of despotism z∗. The greatest level of despotism z∗ = 0.71 is obtained for
2Note that we do not consider indirect benefits here e.g. less inequality could benefit the leader by
increasing the fitness of individuals related to the leader. This is because first we are looking to large
groups in which indirect benefits are limited. And second, this should have limited effect on our results
because increasing the amount of resources received by a related individual requires to reduce of the
same amount the amount of resources kept by the leader.
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the maximum αc and minimum αo ; and the lowest level of despotism z∗ = 0.35 is ob-
tained for the minimum αc and maximum αo . To better understand the contribution of
each variable, a statistical model has been built. To take in account the heteroskedacity
inherent to the model, we built a mixed linear regression model with αo as a random
effect. It shows that αc , αo and their interaction have a significant effect on the level
of despotism at equilibrium z∗ (p-value < 0.001). Because the presence of significant
interaction limits the interpretation of the statistical model, a graphical representation
is presented in figure 6.1.B and figure 6.1.C. They show thatαc has a linear positive effect
on the level of despotism while αo has a exponential linear effect on the level of despot-
ism. In addition, it also depicts a strong interaction between the two variables with the
positive effect of αc on despotism being strongly dependent of the value of αo . In other
words, a more centralised system lead to higher despotism only when followers are also
disconnected from each other. Therefore, it suggests that increasing connectedness of
outgroup members is a efficient way to limit the evolution of despotism.
6.5.2 Analysis 2: Evolution of despotism level and follower’s tolerance
In our second analysis, we allow the tolerance of followers to evolve. Because of the
complexity of the model, we use numerical simulations to analyse the model. The
results of interest are the mean value of the distribution preference z and the level of
despotism defined as the leader’s value of distribution preference zL. In addition, we
present the mean value of mindset m obtained from self-assessment, the mean value of
opinion o obtained from interaction with neighbours, the mean value of bias defined
as the difference between m and o and the frequency of revolution events within the
population. We present the average over long-run time over 5X 107 generations by
sampling 50 data points every 1X 106 time steps. This method is confirmed as a good
approximation of the stationary distribution by the absence of a periodic pattern of
cycles and the standard error between simulations being always less than 0.027 . The
default parameters used in the simulations, unless otherwise specified, are N = 500,
Nc = 25, L = 1, T = 0.1, R = 100, C = 0.1, σm = 0.01 and µ= 0.01. The initial values of
z are sampled on the uniform distribution between [0,1]. For each set of parameters
considered, 50 independent simulations have been realised. The box plots represents
the dispersion of the mean value across time. The results presented as scatter plots show
the mean value of replicates and the error bars represent the standard error between
the mean value of replicates.
Figure 6.2 confirms that increasing the connectedness of the leader and its clique
significantly leads to a higher level of despotism zL , even when the distribution prefer-
ence of followers also evolves. Figure 6.2 shows that above 0.1, further increasing the
connectedness of the clique does not have a significant effect. However, this plateau
is explained by the maximum limit imposed on the distribution preference z. As be-
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Figure 6.2: Long-run time averages over 5 X 107 generations and 50 replicates of the mean level
of fairness z as a function of clique connectedness αc . Grey circles represent the mean value of
distribution preference of the leader zL . Results are compared by pairwise Welch’s t-test (***:

























Mean value of mindset
Mean value of opinion
Percentage of revolution event
Figure 6.3: Long-run time averages over 5 X 107 generations and 50 replicates of the mean mind-
set m, mean opinion z and mean percentage of revolution as a function of clique connectedness
αc . Orange bars represent the mean value of bias defined as the difference between mindset
and opinion.
fore, this result is explained by the evolution of leader distribution preference being
controlled by the threshold at which followers start a revolution and change the leader
and its clique. Figure 6.3 highlights the mechanism behind the centralisation effect: an
increase in clique connectedness αc is translated into a higher negative bias of opinions
which leads to a lower frequency of revolution, and ultimately a higher mean level of
despotism. In addition, Figure 6.2 demonstrates a similar positive effect of the con-
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Figure 6.4: Long-run time averages over 5 X 107 generations and 50 replicates of the mean level
of fairness z as a function of outgroup connectedness αo . Grey circles represents the mean value
of distribution preference of the leader zL .
nectedness of the leader and its clique on the mean value of distribution preference
z. In other words, centralisation leads followers to be more tolerant to despotism. By
deciding of a more skewed distribution of resources, the leader increases its fitness
which causes its distribution preference to spread in the population (the leader is more
often copied). This effect associated with the cost of revolution leads to the mean value
of distribution preference being close to the leader distribution preference. It is also
worth noting that even in a random network and in absence of bias, followers evolve a
relative tolerance to despotism. In addition, in contrast to the previous result, the model
including the evolution of followers’ preference has an overall higher level of despotism.
This result is explained by the follower preference for equality being limited by the cost
of revolution and the necessity of having a threshold proportion of individuals being in
a defiant state at the same time. Finally, a close-up look at the simulations show that
z strongly vary because of succession of period of increasing despotism and period
of revolution. Indeed, the follower preference for equality is dependent of the leader
preference and leads to chaotic variations. Despite this, the upper limit value of z and
its average on long-run time confirms the positive effect of centralisation on the level of
despotism.
Figure 6.4 shows that increasing the connectedness of followers leads to a lower level
of despotism zL, even when the distribution preference of followers also evolves. In
addition, it demonstrates a similar effect on the mean value of distribution preference z
for the reason stated previously. Both of these effects have been tested using a linear
regression and are statistically significant (p-value < 1.10−6). It is worth noting that
the effect of the connectedness of followers on the level of despotism is smaller in
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Percentage of revolution event
Figure 6.5: Long-run time averages over 5 X 107 generations and 50 replicates of the mean
mindset, mean opinion z and mean percentage of revolution as a function of outgroup connec-
tedness αo . Orange bars represent the mean value of bias defined as the difference between
mindset and opinion.
comparison to the results where the tolerance of followers is fixed. However, Figure 6.5
confirms that increasing the connectedness of followers greatly reduces the bias and
therefore increases the frequency of revolution in response to despotic behaviour. In
other words, the influence of the leader and its clique which blind followers judgement
is dependent of disconnected followers. Therefore, the smaller effect of αo on the level
of despotism in this analysis is due to the other constraints affecting the cost and benefit
of revolution as stated in the results looking at the effect of αc . It suggests that the
mechanisms by which individual organise a revolution also affects the evolution of
despotism.
6.6 Discussion
Despite the potential benefits of the hierarchy, centralisation of decision-making ap-
pears to go along with despotism, i.e. inequality enforced by leaders. Yet, it is still hard to
determine if inequality and despotism are an inherent consequence of centralisation or
the result of a common element, e.g. agriculture. Although different factors have been
identified, the role of distribution of influence and its impact on knowledge transfer
has not yet been investigated. To fill this gap, we have simulated such a scenario by
modelling the evolution of distribution preference in groups structured in different
social networks. The model developed demonstrates that the centralisation of social
networks leads to the evolution of higher despotism and inequality. In other words,
a skewed distribution of influence is sufficient to create inequality. This result holds
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when the tolerance of followers is fixed or in a more realistic set-up where tolerance of
followers evolve. This result is explained by the knowledge of followers on the leader’s
decision which is (i) biased by the influential members of the clique, and (ii) limited by
their low connectedness to other followers. As a consequence, followers can not impar-
tially enforce their control on leaders and a fortiori on collectively decided institutional
rules. Furthermore, the model demonstrates that the effect of influential members
on followers’ opinion is strongly dependent on followers having low connectedness.
Indeed, a slight increase in the influence of followers greatly reduces the despotism
created by the clique influence. However, as shown by comparing the first and second
analysis, this effect is weaker when follower’s distribution preference is also evolving.
Overall, this result suggests that increasing the connection between followers could be
a solution to limit despotism in social systems.
The results presented here attempt to bridge the gap between two main research
axes. Previous research work has either examined the impact of centralisation on
opinion formation processes, but without evolutionary processes, or has studied the
evolution of despotism without integrating mechanisms underlying opinion formation.
On the former side, Gavrilets et al. (2016) show that the presence of highly influential
individuals can strongly bias the collective decision. Later on, Pitt (2017) has integrated
institutional rules and interactional justice into a multi-agent systems and show that
hierarchy can bias the followers’ opinion on leader decided rules. We here confirm that
this result still holds even when the evolution of individual preferences for the distribu-
tion of resources are taken in account. Furthermore, we have shown that integrating
the evolution of followers’ preferences can lead to irregular level of despotism but yet,
with the same qualitative behaviours as when only the leader’s distribution preference
evolves. On the other hand, reproductive skew theory used mathematical models to
understand how the conflict between leader and follower affects the evolution of des-
potism (Summers, 2005; Johnstone, 2000). These models have identified the important
factors behind the evolution of inequality such as the cost of leaving the group or the
relative cost of conflict with the leader. Our results complete this previous work by
integrating an opinion formation process and by identifying a new crucial factor in
the evolution of inequality: the distribution of influence itself as modelled by social
network structure. This factor has the advantage of explaining the rise of inequality
from economically egalitarian groups.
Our model predicts that the capacity of followers to efficiently control leader’s
decision is crucial to limit despotism. This result is supported by evidence from behavi-
oural economics experiments. In particular, two economics games called the ultimatum
and the dictator game implement a similar version of the presented model. In the ulti-
matum game, one of two players has to decide how to split a fixed amount of money
and the second player can choose to either accept it and both receive their shares; or
refuse it in which case neither receive anything. However, in the variant called dictator
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game, the second player can’t decide to accept or refuse. Experimental results show that
in the ultimatum game, the proposer keeps in average 60% of the total amount while
in the dictator game the share kept by the proposer goes up to 72% (Oosterbeek et al.,
2004; Engel, 2010). In conclusion, the ability of followers to punish the leader reduces
its tendency toward despotism. Importantly, our results predict that centralisation of
the social network can blind the judgement of followers and transform the distribution
of resources from an ultimatum game to a dictator game. Controlled experiments
implementing these games in large groups could provide a first test to this prediction.
We made a number of assumptions to keep our model tractable. First of all, the
model developed considers only blind evolutionary processes as a driver of change in
distribution preferences. However, cognitive processes might also affect the evolution
of agent preferences and lead to a lower level of despotism, e.g. followers predict that a
low level of despotism favour their positions. This difference suggests that integrating
cognitive processes might be crucial to limit despotism in social systems and would be
worth investigating. Yet, it is important to note that our results still hold over large time
scales in which evolutionary processes are a good predictor of cultural change (Boyd
and Richerson, 1985). Another assumption made concerns the division of the society
into only three groups and with only one leader. In natural social systems, hierarchy can
be composed of many more layers. But this is unlikely to change our qualitative results
since the results presented are explained by the asymmetrical distribution of influence.
Nonetheless, it is crucial to explore similarly the evolution of despotism in other hier-
archical network structures. Finally, we have considered here a simplified version of the
revolution process, which is a step function of the number of defiant individuals. This
assumption leads to follower’s connectedness having a limited effect on the evolution of
despotism because it is difficult for followers to reach the minimum threshold required
to do a revolution. This effect is similar to the result of Weingast (1997) who used a
game theory model to show that revolution is itself a costly coordination task and that
revolution could be successful only in limited conditions. It is important to extend
the model to consider different formalisation of revolution. For instance, extensions
could consider that the probability of revolution is a gradual function of the number
of deviants individuals, rather than a step threshold. Another possibility is that this
limit induced by the threshold could be an important feature and the model could be
extended to integrate the strategies used by individuals to respond to it. This could be
done by integrating more explicitly revolution , e.g. as a Volunteer’s Dilemma game,
along with the strategies used by individuals to play this game.
In conclusion, this model sheds light on the importance of looking at distribution
of influence as a critical factor to understand the evolution of despotism in human
societies. This model combined with previous Chapter 4 and 5 provide a complete scen-
ario to explain the transition from egalitarian groups to both functional and coercive
hierarchical societies. It shows that ”the iron law of oligarchy” theory and the scenario it
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proposes for the emergence of hierarchy is explainable in terms of evolutionary theory.
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Conclusion
The Neolithic transition marks a major turning point in human social organisation. In
a few thousands years, humans groups switch from small tribes of egalitarian hunter-
gatherer to large societies of hierarchical agriculturists. Yet, there is still a debate on
the factors and mechanisms driving this transition. In particular, the evolution of
exploited followers appears as an evolutionary paradox. In this thesis, we explore a
theory from political sciences called “the iron law of oligarchy” using evolution as a
new perspective. The iron law of oligarchy proposes that groups delegate power to a
handful of individuals when group size increases. This is because a growth in group
size increases the number and the complexity of decisions that a group needs to take
in order to work collectively. Centralising authority would appear as a response to this
scalar stress because it facilitates group organisation. The iron law of oligarchy states
that once some individual possess a disproportionate political power, they can use it to
bias group decision and individual opinions in order to create despotism and inequality.
Despite this theory being supported by real world observations, this theory lacks of
a more formal investigation. In particular, it did not consider the rules of evolution,
despite hierarchy emerging from human behaviours and culture, both products of
evolution.
In this thesis, we proposed the evolutionary iron law of oligarchy, which presents a
formal model of the iron law of oligarchy, based on a well-accepted body of theory, the
theory of evolution. We represented individuals by their capacity to influence collective
decisions and social hierarchy as a skewed distribution of this influence. We have
investigated the “evolutionary iron law of oligarchy” by combining models of social
dynamics and evolutionary dynamics. We have filled multiple gaps and shown that:
• a skewness in individual’s influence reduces the time that a group spends to reach
consensus and thus can explain the benefit of hierarchy on organisation
• the organisational benefit of social hierarchy can lead to the evolution of leaders’
and followers’ behaviours, even if it creates inequality
• institutional hierarchy — by group decision — can outcompete informal hierarchy
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— leaders and followers behaviours — despite its additional cost because hierarchy
with a single influential leader provides a better organisational advantage.
• centralised network structure in hierarchical groups leads to the evolution of
despotic leader because well-connected leaders can bias the opinions of isolated
followers.
Overall, this thesis demonstrates that the evolutionary iron law of oligarchy is a viable
scenario to explain the emergence of beneficial hierarchy and despotism in human
societies. In other words, the demographic expansion that came along the advent of
agriculture and its effect on group organisation is sufficient to explain the emergence of
leaders and despots. On the one hand, this thesis contributes to evolutionary theories
of the emergence of hierarchy by unifying voluntary and coercive theories. On the
other hand, this thesis contributes to the iron law of oligarchy by identifying a set of
conditions necessary for the iron law to apply. Ultimately, this thesis shows that the
iron law of oligarchy fits within the paradigm of evolution theory and can be seen as a
consequence of the law of evolution by natural selection.
In this thesis, we have focused on the emergence of hierarchy during the Neolithic
transition. This is because the Neolithic transition is one of the most documented
events and hierarchies observed after the Neolithic transition are relatively simple
compared to more modern societies. However, the iron law of oligarchy originally
proposed by Michels (1911) was built on and for modern organisations such as political
parties. We believe that the evolutionary iron law of oligarchy developed here can also
apply to these cases. Indeed, evolutionary processes encompass cultural items and
preferences, which evolve in a short time scale. In addition, we have used here an
abstracted approach which allows general conclusions. In other words, if the conditions
and mechanisms considered in the model are present, then the results of the model
hold and such, independently of the time period. For instance, an increase in group size
can be due to a higher number of births or the recruitment of more individuals within
a company. Yet, they are the same in abstract, in the sense that they would still result
in an increase of the cost of organisation. Naturally, other mechanisms and processes
might also take place in modern societies. For instance, large groups with participatory
democracy can maintain egalitarian organisation even at large-scale. But rather than
ignoring these cases, an abstracted model provides a mean to understand the effects of
these additional mechanisms. On the same example, participatory democracy could be
seen as reducing the increase of cost of organisation due to increase in group size and
thus in the models developed in this thesis should lead to large but egalitarian groups.
Can the evolutionary iron law of oligarchy explain the emergence of more complex
forms of hierarchy? In particular, chiefdoms are followed by the emergence of states,
characterised by a multi layered and institutionalised hierarchy (Spencer, 1990). This
100
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
question remains hard to answer. On the one hand, multi-layered hierarchy could be
seen as a repetition of simpler forms of hierarchy, also driven by the same constraints
on collective decision-making. In this case, the models developed here could be easily
extended to explain the emergence of states. On the other hand, states could have
qualitative differences and their emergence could be driven by different dynamics.
Nonetheless, we have shown in this thesis the transition from an egalitarian group to
the premises of states, institutional hierarchy.
The limits and further work related to each model is described in each contributed
section. To summarise, they consist of two main aspects. First, the predictions of the
models should be tested either using some real-world data or laboratory experiments.
To do so, there is a large amount of data from anthropological studies which brought
together can show trends (for global data Turchin et al. 2015; Garfield et al. 2019a) but
also, new data are made available by the development of online experiments and online
communities in which thousands of individuals coordinate and organise. Second, the
models developed here can be extended. We remind here one major extension for
each model. The opinion formation model presented in Chapter 3 can be extended to
consider different update rules and an explicit network structure. This would provide
insights on the generality of the benefit of a skewed distribution of influence on time to
consensus. The evolutionary model of Chapter 4 can be combined with Chapter 6 to
incorporate the evolution of despotic preferences. This would create a comprehensive
model of the evolutionary iron law of oligarchy, which would simulate the evolution of
both functional hierarchy and despotism. The model of Chapter 5 can be extended to
include a value of influence defined by both personalities and institutions, in order to
investigate the interactions between informal and institutional hierarchy. The model of
Chapter 6 can be extended to integrate the strategies that followers use to efficiently
coordinate during revolution, and thus provide more realistic predictions on the effect
of social network structure on the level of despotism.
For simplicity, the models presented overlook the determinism of the traits stud-
ied and we considered that traits could be cultural or biological as long as they are
vertically transmitted. In future work and when more data on the determinism of the
traits studied will be available, it is important to extend our models to confirm the
generality of our conclusions. For instance, traits with an important biological basis
require models which integrate more biologically realistic assumptions such as sexual
reproduction, diploidy and possibly multi-locus traits (Crow and Kimura, 1970). An
important cultural basis of traits would call for extensions of the models which integrate
horizontal transmission and particular forms of social learning such as conformity bias
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985).
In this thesis, we have shown that describing the evolution of traits affecting the in-
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fluence of individuals on others and on collective decision is sufficient to explain the
emergence of helpful and despotic leaders. This abstract representation of leaders
and followers, rather than a loss of details, identify the key features of leaders and
followers. In addition, this abstraction has the benefit of generalising the results. For
instance, the results presented in thesis could apply to living organisms doing collective
decision-making by consensus (Conradt and Roper, 2005) and in which, some indi-
viduals are better at transmitting their preferences. This could apply to buffalos (Prins,
1996), African wild dogs (Lycaon pictus) (Walker et al., 2017) or bacteria doing quorum
sensing (Miller and Bassler, 2001). Moreover, this formalisation of leaders and followers
also provides a new approach for experimental work. Indeed, experiments working
on hierarchy often rely on groups with explicitly elected leaders but ignore informal
leadership. The models presented in this thesis do predictions on the influence of
individuals, which is a characteristic that can be measured either from an individual’s
skills to communicate (if looking at intrinsic influence) or the distance between an
individual initial preference and the final decision (if looking at realised influence).
More broadly, the work presented in this thesis fits within the field of social evolution,
which aims to understand how evolution shapes social behaviours. The study of large-
scale societies is a particularly thrilling topic in social evolution because large-scale
human societies exhibit cooperation and coordination at an unprecedented scale. Yet,
most of known mechanisms to ensure cooperation and coordination break down in
large groups (Powers and Lehmann, 2017). This interest is illustrated by the shift
from group to society sometimes described as the fifth major transition of evolution
(Szathmáry and Smith, 1995; Szathmáry, 2015). We have explored here one feature of
large-scale societies, hierarchy, and how it could explain coordination at large-scale.
Another feature of large-scale societies is the prevalence of institutions which could
explain the persistence of cooperation in large-scale (Ostrom, 1990; Powers et al., 2016).
Interestingly, hierarchy and institution could have strongly interacted. First, it could
be because hierarchy can be an institution as seen in Chapter 5. Second, it could be
because institutional rules result from collective decision-making, which is a process
strongly affected by hierarchy as we have seen in this thesis. Further work could focus
on the effect of hierarchy on the final decision rather than the time to consensus, to
look how the distribution of power could affect the evolution of institutional rules.
Despite the importance of understanding large-scale societies, their study has often
been limited by the division of the topic between disciplines. In this thesis, we have
proposed one interdisciplinary approach by combining models of social dynamics and
evolutionary dynamics. We have shown that each field is able to fill gaps in the other
field and ultimately, provide new perspectives. We believe that further work between
these fields can be useful for understanding the emergence of human complex societies.
For example, if statistical physics can provide a mathematical approximation of how the
102
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
distribution of influence affects the time to consensus, this function could be integrated
into more formal evolutionary model, e.g. kin selection model (Gardner et al., 2011) to
provide a more general and robust analysis. Another example is that opinion formation
models could be used to describe other phenomena, such as conflict resolution, in
which leaders appear to play an important role (Glowacki and Rueden, 2015).
Finally, this thesis seems to draw a dark picture. Are humans condemned to despot-
ism? This was the initial vision of Michels (1911) when writing its “iron law of oligarchy’.
From his point of view, human groups will inevitably fall into an oligarchic organisation.
Yet, as observed in the later criticisms of the iron law of oligarchy, despotism is not a
certainty and egalitarianism can be maintained. Rather than supporting the "iron" part
of the theory, this thesis provides means to avoid it by identifying the conditions under
which oligarchy emerges — conditions which can be modified to maintain egalitarian
organisation. For instance, the relationship between group size and cost of organisation
can be reduced by other means that concentrating power in the hands of few. In partic-
ular, the development of internet allows discussion and coordination on a large scale
for low costs. Another example is the relationship between inequality of power and des-
potism which can be limited by particular mechanisms. Constitutions are rules which
clearly state the limit of power of leaders and make them accountable to the majority
(Weingast, 1997). In truth, understanding the factors driving the emergence of hier-
archy and despotism will open new perspectives to design better form of governance
and management. Applications are not restrained to human societies. Artificial social
systems share similar features to human groups. On the one hand, swarms of robots or
smart grids connecting houses also need to coordinate with each other and at a speed
that limits the intervention of humans. On the other hand, most multi agent systems
can share similar capacities than humans, e.g. communication, memory. Already, know-
ledge on leadership and hierarchy is used to improve artificial social systems (Pugliese
et al., 2015; Chih-Han et al., 2010). Ultimately, understanding the drivers behind social
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